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ABSTRACT
Spiceland, Charlene Parnell. PhD. The University of Memphis. May/2013.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Implications for Operational Performance,
Healthcare Quality, and Resource Allocation. Major Professor: Dr. Carolyn Callahan.
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). This three-part dissertation examines the
effects the PPACA could have on the healthcare industry when fully implemented,
particularly as it applies to both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
The first dissertation paper examines both the usefulness of earnings quality for
nonprofit hospitals and the effect on donations of such information. The research uses an
adapted version of the Penman and Zhang (2002) quality score to determine whether
accrual estimates in nonprofit hospitals’ third-party reserve accounts and accompanying
changes in investments are related to the quality of earnings and whether the adapted
quality earnings scores are associated with unrestricted donations. The results indicate
that earnings of nonprofit hospitals are affected by discretionary accruals, resulting in
reduced-quality earnings. However, there is a significant positive relationship between
the lower quality earnings and contributions suggesting that donors are misinformed by
the misleading impact on earnings quality in this regard.
The second dissertation paper examines the market reaction to the passage of the
PPACA. Based on a timeline of events surrounding the passage of the PPACA, three
dates are examined for ‘abnormal’ capital market behavior: (a) Senate Majority Leader
Reid’s letter to Senate Minority Leader McConnell on March 11, 2010, (b) the signing of
the law by President Obama on March 21, 2010, and (c) the Supreme Court upholding of
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the constitutionality of the PPACA on June 28, 2012. The results indicate that both the
Harry Reid letter and the passage of the bill positively impacted the market.
The third dissertation paper considers whether the quality of healthcare that a
hospital provides is associated with cost efficiency and profitability and, if this
relationship exists, whether it varies between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. This
study explores empirically whether high quality hospitals are also those that are
operationally efficient. Quality is measured using metrics designed to proxy the actual
quality metrics defined by the PPACA and to be used in determining hospital payments.
The study finds that a relationship does exist between the quality of healthcare and both
cost efficiency and profitability.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

1

Introduction

2

The Quality of Earnings in Nonprofit Hospitals
Introduction
Motivation and Development of Hypotheses
Methodology and Results
Conclusion

5
9
23
49

Healthcare Reform and its Impact on the Market
Introduction
Motivation and Development of Hypotheses
Methodology and Results
Conclusion

51
53
63
82

3

4

5

1

Linking Healthcare Quality and the Bottom Line: What Do We Know?
Introduction
Motivation and Development of Hypotheses
Methodology and Results
Conclusion

84
86
94
109

Conclusion

111

References

113

Appendix

120

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1

Description of Sample

28

2

Distribution of Third Party Reserve Index and Earnings Quality
Index over Hospital-Years; 2001 – 2011

29

Summary of Core Returns on Total Net Operating Assets in Years
Relative to the Q-Scoring (Year 0), for Groups of Firms wit High,
Medium, and Low Q-Scores

33

Summary of Core Returns on Net Operating Assets in Years
Relative to the Q-Scoring (Year 0), for Groups of Firms with High,
Medium, and Low Q-Scores

35

5

Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,735)

41

6

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Unrestricted
Contributions on Absolute Value of Q-Scores and Factors to Control
for Risk 2001 – 2011

42

7

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

43

8

Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,735)

44

9

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

45

10

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

46

11

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Unrestricted
Contributions on Absolute Value of Q-Scores, SUSPECTS,
COSTSHFTRS and Factors to Control for Risk 2001 - 2011

47

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Unrestricted
Contributions on Absolute Value of Q-Scores, ABSQ*SUSPECTS,
ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS and Factors to Control for Risk 2001 - 2011

48

13

Description of Sample

65

14

T-Statistics for Significance of CARS

68

15

Difference in healthcare portfolio, Value-Weighted, March 11th

72

16

Difference in healthcare portfolio, Value-Weighted, March 21st

72

3

4

12

vii

17

Difference in healthcare portfolio, Equal-Weighted, March 11th

73

18

Difference in healthcare portfolio, Equal-Weighted, March 21st

73

19

T-Statistics for Significance of CARS, S & P Total Market Index

75

20

T-Statistics for Significance of CARS, S & P 500

76

21

March 11th by Sector, Equal-Weighted

78

22

March 11th by Sector, Value-Weighted

79

23

March 21st by Sector, Equal-Weighted

80

24

March 21st by Sector, Value-Weighted

81

25

Description of Sample

98

26

Descriptive Statistics – Nonprofit Hospitals (N = 451)

99

27

Descriptive Statistics – For-profit Hospitals (N = 131)

100

28

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

100

29

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

101

30

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

101

31

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

102

32

Correlations between Hospital Characteristic Variables

102

33

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics
on Absolute Value of Daily Revenue per Bed and Factors to Control
for Risk 2009-2011 Nonprofit Hospitals

103

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics
on Absolute Value of Daily Operating Expenses per Bed and Factors
to Control for Risk 2009-2011 Nonprofit Hospitals

104

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics
on Absolute Value of Net Operating Income per Bed and Factors
to Control for Risk 2009-2011 Nonprofit Hospitals

105

34

35

viii

36

37

38

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics
on Absolute Value of Daily Revenue per Bed and Factors to Control
for Risk 2009-2011 For-profit Hospitals

106

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics
on Absolute Value of Daily Operating Expenses per Bed and Factors
to Control for Risk 2009-2011 For-profit Hospitals

107

Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics
on Absolute Value of Net Operating Income per Bed and Factors
to Control for Risk 2009-2011 Nonprofit Hospitals

108

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Dissertation Integration Overview

2

Mean Core Return on Total Net Operating Assets for High and Low
Q-Score Groups over Three Years before and after the Q Scoring Year,
Year 0

32

Mean Core Return on Net Operating Assets for High and Low
Q-Score Groups over Three Years before and after the Q Scoring Year,
Year 0

34

4

Timeline of Events Preceding Passage of the PPACA

60

5

CAR for March 11, 2010

65

6

CAR for March 21, 2010

66

7

CAR for June 28, 2012

66

8

Medicare Benefit Payments by Type of Service, 2011

92

9

Magnitude of Impact Example

94

3

4

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). According to Samora and Hettrich (2012,
para. 3), it “represents the most significant regulatory overhaul of the U.S. healthcare
system since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.” Most certainly, the
ramifications of this law on the United States healthcare system are far-reaching. Though
it is primarily known for its goal of decreasing the number of uninsured Americans, it
also is aimed at reducing the overall costs of health care. This three-part dissertation
examines the effects the PPACA could have on the healthcare industry when fully
implemented, particularly as it applies to both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
The first dissertation paper examines both the usefulness of earnings quality for
nonprofit hospitals and the effect on donations of such information. Under the PPACA,
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will link hospital payments with
improvements in patient care. Given the current financial state of nonprofit hospitals and
the increased pressure they face to issue more reliable financial statements while
increasing the quality and accountability of hospital services, a closer examination of
nonprofit accounting is warranted. The research uses an adapted version of the Penman
and Zhang (2002) quality score to determine (1) whether accrual estimates in nonprofit
hospitals’ third-party reserve accounts and accompanying changes in investments are
related to the quality of earnings for nonprofit hospitals and (2) whether the adapted
quality earnings scores are associated with unrestricted donations. This study expands
the empirical setting of Penman and Zhang (2002) by examining nonprofit firms,
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specifically U.S. nonprofit hospitals that are tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC). These organizations have not previously been studied in
this context.
The second dissertation paper examines the passage of the PPACA. Could this
law have an economic effect on both consumers and the value of companies in the
healthcare industry? Did the stock market consider the passage important information?
Since its constitutionality was in question at the time of passage, a second date when the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the PPACA also is examined. The intent is
to determine whether market participants in the aggregate perceive the passage of this
law as information to be incorporated into equilibrium prices of healthcare entities. A
second objective is to determine if all areas of the healthcare industry are affected
equally, or if the law is considered to be more informative to some areas of the healthcare
industry than to other areas of the healthcare industry, i.e. hospitals or healthcare insurers.
The third dissertation paper considers whether the quality of healthcare that a
hospital provides is associated with profitability and cost efficiency and, if this
relationship exists, whether it varies between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.
Information Protectionism, which is the hesitancy of hospitals to share information with
other hospitals or external stakeholders because of concerns over reputation, liability, or
competition, is suggested as a reason the relationship may not exist or might differ
between hospitals with equity stakeholders and those without equity stakeholders. Under
the PPACA, HHS will link hospital payments with improvements in patient care. This
study explores empirically whether high quality hospitals are also those that are
operationally efficient. The procedures used are applied to hospital-level quality data
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downloadable from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) website and hospital
data from California. Quality is measured using metrics designed to proxy the actual
quality metrics defined by the PPACA and to be used in determining hospital payments.
This study will be the first to my knowledge to project the quality metrics CMS will use
to pay hospitals and the effect that producing this quality of healthcare could have on
profitability.
In sum, Figure 1 illustrates how this three-paper dissertation strives to contribute
to existing literature by considering influences and benefits associated with the passage of
the PPACA. Specifically, the study begins by examining the need to improve the quality
of accounting due to the change in Medicare fees in nonprofit hospitals. The dissertation
also attempts to make methodological contributions by adapting a financial tool for use in
the nonprofit hospital setting. Second, the study examines the market reaction to the
passage of the law. Finally, the focus shifts to examine the effect of the new payment
method as it relates to quality of healthcare for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
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Healthcare Quality is measured using metrics designed to proxy the actual quality metrics defined by the PPACA. The procedures used are applied to hospital-level quality
data downloadable from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) website and hospital data from California.

PPACA Passage refers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law on March 23, 2010. According to Vincini and Stempel (2012), it “represents the
most significant regulatory overhaul of the U.S. healthcare system since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.”

Third Party Reserve Management refers to managing an account used in hospitals to revalue the balance of receivables due from third-party payers like Medicare and
Medicaid to a more realistic portrayal of how much cash actually will be received.
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CHAPTER 2
THE QUALITY OF EARNINGS IN NONPROFIT HOSPITALS
I.

Introduction
Despite the fact that 16% of the world’s largest economy is expended on

providing health care to its citizens, nonprofit hospitals have received scant attention
from accounting scholars. More specifically, little research has focused on earnings
quality for nonprofits, even though earnings of nonprofit hospitals are presumably used to
help evaluate hospital management and allocate scarce donor resources. The purpose of
this paper is to examine the usefulness of earnings quality in nonprofit hospitals and the
effect of such information on donations.
An impediment to earnings quality in hospitals is a commonly used “Third-Party
Payers Reserve” account. Due to the financial risks associated with fee revenue for
services provided, financial managers of hospitals must make estimates that are reported
in this Third-Party Payers Reserve account. Similar to an Allowance for Uncollectible
Receivables Account, this account is established to revalue the balance of receivables due
from third-party payers like Medicare and Medicaid to a more realistic portrayal of how
much cash actually will be received. The amounts of these payments are notoriously
unpredictable. Prior literature has not sufficiently addressed the effect of this account,
even though third party payers such as Medicare, Medicaid and insurance companies
provide massive payments, allowing for large variances in the account to go unnoticed.
Within the accounting circles of the healthcare industry, the inherent uncertainty with
regard to this account is well-known. However, outside this relatively small group, the
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account receives little or no notice. Understandably then, it has received little attention
from accounting researchers.
Changes in accounting estimates have been found to have an effect on the quality of
earnings in for-profit organizations (Healy and Wahlen 1999 for one). That line of
research characterizes managers as creating unsustainable earnings by temporarily
reducing estimates of bad debts or depreciation (Teoh et al. 1998) or lowering loan loss
reserves (Beaver and Engel 1996). If the effect is temporary, it will reverse later. Since
current earnings in such situations are weak indicators of future earnings, the result is
poor quality earnings. Evidence exists that some nonprofits (i.e., charities, hospitals,
universities) intentionally manage, or even intentionally misreport, financial information
to influence how program or fundraising costs are reported (Keating et al. 2006) and to
maximize revenue by manipulating patient volumes, variable costs, and contractual
adjustments (Blanchard et al. 1986; Eldenburg and Soderstrom 1996). One question this
paper examines is whether the earnings of nonprofit hospitals are affected by the estimates

of managers in the Third-Party Payers Reserve account.
A recent event that magnifies the importance of information provided by hospitals
is the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in March
2010. The PPACA is projected to have an extensive economic impact on the healthcare
system in general and on hospitals in particular. Under PPACA, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) will link hospital payments with improvements in
patient care. Beginning in October 2012, Medicare will reward hospitals that provide
high quality care for their patients and financially penalize hospitals that are inefficient
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and fail to comply with health quality standards set by the Hospital Inpatient Quality
Reporting Program.1
Given the current financial state of nonprofit hospitals and the increased pressure
they face to issue more reliable financial statements while increasing the quality and
accountability of hospital services, a closer examination of nonprofit finances is
warranted. The focus of this paper is on the quality of hospitals’ reported earnings.
The response of the nonprofit community to the need for financial information has
been to focus on the accessibility of the existing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form
990 and volunteer posting of information on the Internet through Guidestar.com, a
nonprofit-sponsored project completed in 2005 that provides financial information on
nonprofits by utilizing a search engine on a web site (Keating and Frumkin 2000).
Financial support for nonprofit hospitals comes not only from the government, but
from private sources as well. Prior research provides evidence that donors and grantors
use financial information to determine contribution decisions (e.g., Weisbrod and
Dominguez 1986; Tinkelman 1999; Greenlee and Brown 1999, Parsons 2003, and Frank
et al. 1990). Current and potential users who are especially affected by earnings quality
include service beneficiaries, resource providers, governing oversight bodies and
managers (SFAC No. 4, FASB 1980c, par.29). Further, watchdog groups issue ratings
based largely on Form 990 financial information. These ratings depend heavily on
efficiency ratios – such as the ratio of program expense to total expense and the ratio of
fundraising expense to total contributions – to evaluate spending efficiency (Parsons
2003). These metrics lose meaning when the accounting data on which they are based
lack quality.
1

See www.HealthCare.gov/news/factsheets/valuebasedpurchasing04292011b.html

7

In addition to examining whether earnings of nonprofit hospitals are affected by
specific discretionary accruals, this paper examines whether donors are aware of and
react to these low quality earnings by reducing contributions. Research by Krishnan and
Yetman (2011) indicates that nonprofit hospitals often shift expenses from administrative
and fundraising categories toward program service categories to help increase donations.
Besides administrative and fundraising expenses, do donors recognize and react to the
quality of earnings?
A study by Penman and Zhang (2002) developed diagnostic measures of the joint
effect of investment and conservative accounting. They found that these measures
forecast differences in future return on net operating assets relative to current return on
net operating assets. The focus of their research was on for-profit companies in a variety
of industries. This study utilizes a variation of the diagnostic measures developed by
Penman and Zhang and applies that metric in a nonprofit hospital setting. Adjustments
are made to the model to focus on the effects of changes in estimates of third-party payers
and whether these diagnostic measures can be used to predict nonprofit hospital earnings.
This study extends the Penman and Zhang (2002) research and contributes to
prior literature in at least three ways. First, this study expands the empirical setting by
examining nonprofit firms, specifically U.S. nonprofit hospitals that are tax-exempt under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)2. These organizations have not
previously been studied in this context. Second, the results offer evidence of whether any
effect of the estimated third-party payer reserves is temporary and so subsequently
2

§ 501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 501 requires that charities be “organized and operated
exclusively” for an approved purpose, which includes those that are “religious, charitable, scientific,…or
educational” in nature. The qualifying entity cannot exist for the benefit of its insiders and is prohibited
from distributing any profits to directors, officers, or members.” Further, eligible organizations must stay
clear of political activities such as influencing legislation or campaigning.
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reverses in a revision of the estimate. If the change in the reserve is temporary, then the
induced change in earnings also is temporary and not indicative of future earnings. Third,
this study intends to provide stimulus to enhance the quality of accrual accounting
standards in the nonprofit healthcare setting.
The results of the research indicate that earnings of nonprofit hospitals are
affected by discretionary accruals, resulting in reduced-quality earnings. However, there
is a significant positive relationship between the lower quality earnings and contributions
suggesting that donors are misinformed by the misleading impact on earnings quality in
this regard. The modified metrics utilized to conduct this analysis could be used
internally by management of nonprofit hospitals for financial analysis into the quality of
earnings. The results of the study provide support for efforts by accounting regulators to
implement and monitor accrual-based reporting by nonprofit hospitals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
motivation for the study and develops the hypotheses, Section 3 presents the
methodology and results, and Section 4 concludes.
II.

Motivation and Development of Hypotheses

Motivation
Theory
Prior research has found that the initial aspiration and motivation of nonprofit
executives is consistent with stewardship theory (Van Slyke 2006; Caers et al. 2006).
Stewardship theory posits that managers, left on their own, will act as responsible
stewards of the assets they control. This theory is an alternative view of agency theory,
which holds that managers will act in their own self-interests at the expense of
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shareholders unless appropriate governance structures are implemented to safeguard the
interests of shareholders. Stewardship theory portrays a relationship in which the agent
values the effect of his or her actions on the utility of the organization to such an extent
that pursuing his or her own purposes would generate a higher utility cost than any
benefit gained (Van Slyke 2006).
It also can be argued that agents self-select their career choices to be better
aligned with their own personal goals. In other words, applicants are aware of the lack of
financial incentives such as stock options in nonprofit organizations. The applicants who
decide to opt for these jobs are motivated by a need to exercise responsibility and
authority and to achieve inherently challenging work. The executive, according to this
theory, strives to be an effective steward of the corporate assets, and gains intrinsic
satisfaction through non-financial rewards (Donaldson and Davis 1991).
Thus, stewardship theory holds that there is no issue with manager motivation.
Performance variation arises from the limitations of the organizational structure in which
the manager operates. In the case of nonprofit hospitals, the manager may strive to
provide accurate financial information and quality earnings; however he or she is limited
by the hospital system, data availability, and lack of knowledge concerning the intricacies
of third-party payers and amount of reimbursements for services.
Nonprofit hospitals
Unlike the corporate sector, nonprofit hospitals have no equity stakeholders. The
assumption is that nonprofit hospitals seek to maximize their philanthropic objective
function rather than their profit. Nonprofit hospitals have social objectives, such as
providing healthcare services to the community and charity care to the indigent.
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Hospitals are expected to expend available resources to maximize their objectives subject
to a zero-profit constraint (Leone and Van Horn 2005). In contrast to the for-profit
setting where earnings are used to evaluate managers’ ability to increase firm value,
hospital CEO’s are evaluated on relevant, multifaceted data relating to performance on
community, organizational and individual professional objectives (e.g., improving level
and quality of care to the community).
Being classified as a nonprofit hospital does not mean that the organization cannot
make a profit. Many nonprofit hospitals do, in fact, report profits. By definition,
nonprofit organizations are prohibited from distributing their profits and must reinvest all
earnings in the business. This means that no parties have a claim to a nonprofit’s residual
earnings. There are no shareholders; nonprofits cannot issue equity.
Charitable organizations report financial information to the IRS annually on Form
990 or 990-EZ. Several private watchdog groups (oversight agencies) also monitor
nonprofit hospitals. In addition to governmental regulation and private oversight,
reputation is vitally important in the nonprofit sector. The charitable sector relies on
donor trust and confidence. If this trust is broken, and donors feel they are not receiving
an adequate return on their investments, they will stop giving. To survive, nonprofit
hospitals must build donor trust by effectively using donations to keep administrative and
fundraising costs low, paying reasonable salaries to executives, and avoiding large
scandals (Gilkeson 2007).
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Nonprofit hospital stakeholders
The nonprofit hospital sector has three primary groups of stakeholders: (1) clients
who use nonprofit hospital services, (2) donors who provide charitable support, and (3)
the community that benefit directly from the services (Keating and Frumkin 2000).
Some nonprofit organizations still do depend totally on charitable contributions;
however, the majority of nonprofit hospitals today rely on revenue from fees and other
commercial activities (Blackwood, et al. 2008). The fees and services that these
organizations offer are affected by client satisfaction. Since prices are based on costs,
accurate and timely financial information is invaluable to ensure competitive prices, keep
costs down, and facilitate client satisfaction (Porter and Miller 1985). For those hospitals
that depend on contributed income, keeping the donor satisfied and continuing to
contribute is vitally important. Donors want to ensure that charitable resources are not
used for non-charitable purposes, which would impede the donor’s intent as well as the
stated purpose of the nonprofit hospital (Keating and Frumkin 2000). Frank et al. (1990)
report that the level of charity care and the hospital’s profitability are important criteria
for potential donors considering making donations. They find an inverse relation
between financial performance and the level of donations to hospitals. Research by
Mensah and Werner finds that enhanced financial flexibility appears to lead to higher
cost inefficiency. Several studies empirically confirm that more efficient nonprofit
hospitals receive larger charitable contributions (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986; Posnett
and Sandler 1989; Tinkelman 1999). By providing timely and reliable financial
information, donors will be more comfortable that their donations are being utilized in the
most efficient manner.
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Nonprofit hospitals provide critical resources to neighborhoods and communities.
Taxpayers and community members require these charities to be accountable. Their tax
burden may increase if exemptions are granted to ineffective hospitals or if government
grants fund hospital programs that are not valuable to the community. Increasingly in the
last decade political and community leaders have tried to hold hospitals accountable for
their community benefit responsibilities (Burns 2004; Lee et al. 2004; Owens 2005;
Alexander and Lee 2006). National health expenditures account for a rising percentage of
the gross domestic product (GDP).3
At the Health Financial Management Association’s Leadership Conference on
Value: Delivering Accountable Care, HFMA President and CEO Richard L. Clarke,
DHA, FHFMA, told attendees, “Quality encompasses outcomes, safety, and patient
experience, while cost is a dynamic of the payment received from healthcare purchasers,
including payers, employers, and consumers” (HFMA 2011). Accountability
necessitates financial information be accurate and reliable (Keating and Frumkin 2000).
The three main stakeholder groups may have different motives, but all benefit from the
ability to accurately measure financial performance.
Third-party payers and financial risks to hospitals
A key issue today for hospitals, whether they are for-profit or nonprofit, is the
financial risks associated with fee revenue for services provided. A large proportion of
the healthcare industry receives its revenues from insurers known as third-party payers.
Third-party payers fall into two broad categories: private insurers and public programs.

3

Total spending on healthcare in the United States, including both private and public spending, currently
accounts for approximately 16 percent of GDP. The Office of the Actuary projections in September 2010
anticipate that the healthcare reform law combined with the current healthcare spending trend will result in
U.S. healthcare spending making up nearly 20 percent of the economy by 2019 (HFMA 2011).
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The major private insurers are Blue Cross/Blue Shield, commercial insurers, and selfinsurers. The two major government insurance programs are Medicare and Medicaid.
Regardless of the payer, the payment methods fall into two broad classifications:
fee-for-service and capitation. Fee-for-service systems reimburse hospitals based on the
quantity of services provided. The key feature is that the more services that are
performed, the greater the reimbursement amount. With the capitation method, the
hospital is paid a fixed amount per patient per period (usually monthly) regardless of the
amount of services provided (Gapenski 2008).
Under all fee-for-service approaches, the key to financial success for the hospital
is to work harder and increase services, thus increasing revenue. On the other hand,
capitation focuses on working smarter by reducing services, reducing expenses, and
keeping patients healthy. Capitation actually reigned in the 1990's as the best way to
curtail hospitals from encouraging unnecessary procedures. However, the acceptance
subsided as patients found that many necessary procedures were denied by hospitals as a
means of controlling costs (Forlini 2010).
Regardless of the reimbursement payment method, uncertainty and risk confront
hospitals. The hospitals bear the financial risk because they have little control over the
revenues or fees paid by third-parties, and costs often exceed revenues. The bundle of
services needed to treat a patient may be more than assumed when the fees are filed. To
add to the revenue uncertainty, a policy change that could assist in delivering costeffective care to the marketplace is included in the PPACA4. The rules go into effect

4

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 1st Sess., § 3022 (2009-10) (Senate
version).
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November of 2012. The change involves the creation of Medicare pilot programs for
“Accountable Care Organizations” (“ACOs”). 5
Hypothesis development
Effects of third-party reserves and investment on rates of return
Quality of earnings in this study is defined in terms of the sustainability of
earnings. To examine the sustainability of earnings, the methodology utilizes a variation
of the diagnostic measures developed by Penman and Zhang (2002) that focuses on the
persistence of accounting rates of return. Penman and Zhang (2002) developed a metric
for scoring firms by examining the effects of the interaction between conservatism and
changes in growth. Since this paper is examining the nonprofit healthcare industry and
third-party reserves, the metric is modified to examine the effects of changes in thirdparty reserves.
When hospital management reduces investments in the third-party reserves, the
hospital's rate of return will increase as the reserve is released. Hospital management can
increase these reserves by increasing the investment and, thus, reduce earnings. If this
change in the reserve is temporary, then the increase or decrease in the return also should
be temporary. If a temporary change in reserves leads to a temporary change in a
reported accounting rate of return, then the current earnings will be a poor indicator of
future earnings, and accordingly, earnings quality is deemed to be low. If a donor values
5

An ACO is a group of providers, which may include primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals,
who agree to be held accountable for the cost and quality of healthcare delivered to a defined population of
Medicare beneficiaries. The ACO model allows for the physicians and hospitals to lead both the practice
of medicine and the cost containment process rather than have those processes be led by third-party
payers. The manner in which the ACO providers receive reimbursement from Medicare will drive the cost
containment process. The Act combines existing fee-for-service payments with shared savings incentive
payments for achieving quality performance measures and for reducing Medicare expenditures by a certain
percentage below a predetermined benchmark. The Act specifies that one of the alternative payment
models could be a partial capitation model in which the ACO would be at financial risk for some of the
services provided (Liethen 2010).
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the financial quality of a hospital for donation purposes without understanding that the
earnings are unsustainable, the donor could be disappointed with his choice of hospitals
or entities for charitable contributions.
Quality of earnings
Assessing sustainability of earnings is a form of earnings forecasting. Assessing
sustainability of earnings is a form of earnings forecasting. Dechow et al. (2010) provide
a comprehensive review of earnings quality by examining over 350 studies spanning
several decades. The authors point out that quality of earnings is a function of the firm’s
fundamental performance and “depends on whether it is informative about the firm’s
financial performance, many aspects of which are unobservable”. The article classifies
each paper into one of two groups according to whether it provides evidence on the
determinants or the consequences of the earnings quality proxy it examines. The
determinants papers propose or test theories about features of a firm or of the accounting
measurement system that cause an earnings income. The focus of this paper is on the
determinants of an earnings quality metric; therefore, this paper is based on the empirical
and theoretical foundation of the determinants of earnings quality.
Ball and Watts (1972) examine earnings forecasting by taking current earnings as a
starting point to develop forecasts. They find that corporate incomes follow a
submartingale or similar process. The authors apply different methods of time series to
corporate incomes. The implication of their research for forecasters in accounting and
finance implies that attempts to smooth corporates incomes in the manner suggested at
the time are not successful. From this point, some papers estimate persistence from
earnings time series. By addressing the valuation implications of the time-series
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properties of earnings, Komendi and Lipe (1987) uncover a new dimension to the
information content of earnings. In the process, they find no evidence that the reactions
of stock returns to unexpected earnings are excessively volatile. Other papers examine
accounting information beyond past earnings for indications of sustainability.
This paper follows the latter approach through its interpretation of operating
assets, cash investment, accruals, and the growth in sales. Abnormal accruals are the
single most popular proxy used in earnings quality, and there has been nearly continual
innovations made to these proxies. The earliest study that employs abnormal accruals as
a proxy is Healy (1985). Healy analyzes the format of typical bonus contracts, providing
a more complete characterization of their accounting incentive effects than earlier studies.
He uses two classes of tests: accrual tests and tests of changes in accounting procedures.
Healy defines accruals as the difference between reported earnings and cash flows from
operations by examining non-cash working capital and depreciation. Two other papers,
Jones (1991) and Sloan (1996) use this type of definition of accruals.
With the introduction of the abnormal accruals model in Jones (1991), earnings
quality research expanded. Jones examines import relief investigations by the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC). She defines the accrual process (working
capital accruals and depreciation) as a function of sales growth and PPE. The Jones
model is noteworthy for providing the literature with a frequently used metric for
abnormal accruals. In 1994, Dechow expands Jones’ model when she investigates
circumstances under which accruals are predicted to improve earnings’ ability to measure
firm performance, as signaled in stock returns. She hypothesizes that as the use of
accruals increase, the shorter the performance measurement interval, the greater the
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volatility of the firm’s working capital requirements and investment and financing
activities, and the longer the firm’s operating cycle. The results of Dechow’s
investigation indicate that under each of these circumstances, cash flows are predicted to
suffer more severely from timing and matching problems that reduce their ability to
reflect firm performance.
As mentioned above, Sloan (1996) also defines accruals as non-cash working
capital and depreciation. Sloan investigates whether stock prices reflect information
about future earnings contained in the accrual and cash flow components of current
earnings. He acquires these numbers by backing them out of the balance sheet. The
extent to which current earnings performance persists into the future is shown to depend
on the relative magnitudes of the cash and accrual components of current earnings. Sloan
defines the accrual portion of earnings as:

Accrual Component =

Accruals
Average Total Assets

Healy, Jones, and Sloan study the use of accruals by managers that create
unsustainable earnings by temporarily reducing estimates and reversing the effect later by
revising the estimates. DeChow et al. (1998) develops a model of earnings, cash flows,
and accruals assuming the only accruals are accounts receivable, accounts payable and
inventory. In the model that Dechow et al. uses, the difference varies with the operating
cash cycle and implies that earnings better predict future operating cash flows than
current operating cash flows.
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Collins and Hribar (2002) examine the impact of measuring accruals as the
change in successive balance sheet accounts, as opposed to measuring accruals directly
from the statement of cash flows. The authors find that studies using a balance sheet
approach to test for earnings management such as the approaches used by Jones (1991)
and DeChow et al. (1998) are potentially contaminated by measurement error in accruals
estimates. In addition, results show that the errors in balance sheet accruals estimation
can obscure returns regressions where discretionary and non-discretionary accruals are
used as explanatory variables. Collins and Hribar demonstrate that erroneous
classifications of “extreme” accruals firms result in understated tests of market
mispricing of accruals.
Two abnormal accruals proxies gaining acceptance in the literature are the proxies
introduced in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). The Dechow and
Dichev model improves on the Jones model by more precisely mapping cash flows into
the accruals producing process. This model was also designed as a proxy for both
intended and unintended factors that influence earnings quality. Francis et al. (2005)
separates the variation in earnings quality into the portion resulting from the distinctive
application of the accounting system and the portion resulting from management
discretion. In their investigation of whether investors price accruals quality, they use
accruals quality as the proxy for the information risk associated with earnings. By
measuring accruals quality as the standard deviation of residuals from regressions
relating current accruals to cash flows, they find that poorer accruals quality is associated
with larger costs of debt and equity.
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Richardson et al. (2005) links accrual reliability to earnings persistence by
constructing a model showing that less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings
persistence. The authors develop a comprehensive balance sheet categorization of
accruals and rated each category according to the reliability of the underlying accruals.
Since it is necessary to reconcile the change in earnings from the balance sheet with
earnings and dividends, Richardson et al.’s research is more similar to research that
assumes clean surplus. Just as profitability can be broken into accruals and cash flows
from operations, growth in net operating assets can be broken into accruals and growth in
long-term net operating assets. The authors find that, after controlling for current
profitability, both components of growth in net operating assets - accruals and growth in
long-term net operating assets - have equivalent negative associations with one-yearahead return on assets.
Ohlson (2010) extends the clean surplus idea as it relates to underlying accruals
and provides a broad discussion of the topic “accruals”. Though much of what is said is
familiar from the literature on accruals, the paper tries to show how concepts develop
tight links across a variety of themes. The starting point of his analysis concerns the
construct of an accrual. Ohlson makes the case that it should rest solely on consecutive
balance sheets and the splitting of assets/liabilities into cash, assets/liabilities and all
other kinds of assets/liabilities. Once the asses/liabilities are divided, the components of
the foundation equation cash earnings + net accrual = comprehensive earnings can be
measured. Ohlson discusses how the net accrual relates to growth in a firm’s operating
activities and the extent to which this can be informative or misleading.
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Since operating income is sustained by investment in assets, and operating income
is expected to increase with each new investment, the interpretation of both cash
investment and accruals is conditional upon the growth of sales (Penman and Zhang,
2002). Penman and Zhang define high quality earnings to be “sustainable earnings.” The
converse could therefore be stated that any accounting treatment which produces
unsustainable earnings would be of poor quality. Given that the effect is temporary and
the reported earnings are not a good indicator of future earnings, the reported earnings are
of poor quality. The authors develop diagnostic measures of this joint effect of
investment and conservative accounting and find that these measures forecast differences
in future return on net operating assets relative to current return on net operating assets.
They also find indications that investors do not appreciate how changes in investment
combine to raise questions about the quality of reported earnings.
The for-profit literature has thoroughly documented the link between the accrual
portion of earnings and the persistence of current earnings performance (Sloan 1996;
Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 1998; Francis et al. 2005). The demand for high-quality
for-profit public company financial statements encourages managers and auditors to
make accurate accrual estimates (Doyle et al. 2007). According to Sepe and Spiceland
(2008), “the term earnings quality refers to the ability of reported earnings (income) to
predict a company’s future earnings.” Financial statement relevance centers on its
predictive value. Penman and Zhang (2002) define high quality earnings to be
“sustainable earnings.” The converse could therefore be stated that any accounting
treatment which produces unsustainable earnings would be of poor quality.
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Since estimates are applied in the creation of accruals, past for-profit industries'
research concerning poor-quality earnings have investigated total accruals (Healy 1985),
extreme accruals (Sloan 1996), and discretionary accruals (Jones 1991). Those studies
portray managers as creating unsustainable earnings by temporarily reducing estimates
and later reversing the effect by revising the estimates. Given that the effect is temporary
and the reported earnings are not a good indicator of future earnings, the reported
earnings are of poor quality (Penmen and Zhang 2002).
Yet, we know little about the implications of poor quality earnings in the
nonprofit sector. Due to the fact that nonprofit hospitals have no shareholders and cannot
issue equity, the vested interest of the nonprofit stakeholders may not be great as
compared to the stakeholders in the for-profit organizations. However, the absence of
profit maximization motivation does not diminish the need for a high-quality metric to
measure the validity of the financial performance against stated objectives. In other
words, there still is a need to improve public accountability (e.g. GASB 1987). In
addition to the need to improve accountability, nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals
both are required to allocate scarce economic resources to the production and distribution
of goods and services (Pinnuck and Potter 2009).
The examination of quality information is motivated by two concerns. First, it
provides evidence concerning both the demand for information and the quality of
financial reporting by nonprofit entities. Second, the examination brings to light the
importance of understanding the complexities of third-party payments and the effect this
has on earnings quality. If the third-party reserve account is estimated incorrectly,
current earnings are a poor indicator of future earnings. This would mean that when
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charted over time, future earnings would not react in a manner indicated by previous
earnings. On the other hand, if the third-party reserve account is estimated correctly,
future earnings would chart in an expected path. Accordingly, the first hypothesis tested,
stated in null form is:
H1: Accrual estimates in nonprofit hospitals’ third-party reserve accounts are
unrelated to quality of earnings.
Many hospitals today depend on unrestricted contributions to assist them,
particularly when their estimated third-party revenues fall short of their expenses. If
donors have difficulty monitoring the quality or quantity of profit levels reported,
donations to the hospitals could be reduced (Keating and Frumkin 2000, Frank et al.
1990). However, the question of whether donors monitor or even understand the
sustainability of earnings has not been addressed. The second hypothesis tested, again
stated in null form is:
H2: Quality of earnings is unrelated to the quantity of unrestricted donations.
III.

Methodology and Results

Data
Data are downloaded from California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (OSHPD) website.6 In California, the OSHPD requires hospitals providing
medical care in the state to supply detailed information annually. The OSHPD, which is a
department of the California Health and Human Services Agency, collects, analyzes, and
disseminates the data on hospitals licensed in California. The information collected by
OSHPD includes utilization data (beds, days, and discharges), financial statements
(balance sheet and income statement), revenues by payer, expenses by natural
6

See http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnnFinanData/CmplteDataSet/index.asp
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classification, and payroll data by employee classification. Financial reports filed with
the OSHPD must comply with United States GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles).
Indexes of Reserves and Earnings Quality
Information from the OSHPD is used to develop the two indices of the earnings
quality (Penman and Zhang 2002). The first index scores the relative size of a firm’s
estimated third-party reserve. The second index scores the quality of earnings that results
from the joint effect of the quality of the reserve estimate and changes in investment
activity.
Reserve Index (R-score)
The R-score measures the effect of third-party reserves on the balance sheet. The
R-score is the level of estimated third-party reserves, TR, relative to net operating assets:

TRit
(1)
Rit = NOAit
where i indicates hospitals and t indicates balance sheet dates. The calculation for thirdparty reserve components (TRit) includes traditional Medicare revenue reserves, managed
care Medicare revenue reserves, traditional Medi-cal revenue reserves, managed care
Medi-cal revenue reserves, traditional county indigent revenue reserves, managed care
county indigent revenue reserves, other traditional third-party revenue reserves, and other
managed care third-parties revenue reserves.7

7

The third-party reserve components are taken from the income statement and consist of the expense in the
third-party reserve for t income statement date. Essentially, this component represents the change in the
third-party reserve for the current year and is compared to the change in reserve for the previous year.
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Net operating assets components (NOAit) are calculated as total assets minus
financial assets (those assets in which the firm invests excess cash). 8
Earnings quality Indicator (Q-Score)
The Q-score measures the effect of third-party reserves on earnings in the income
statement. The Q-score is a combination of two measures. The first measure, Qit A is
calculated as:

Qit

A

TRit _ TRit – 1
= NOAit NOAit – 1

(2)

In other words, Qit A is the year-to-year change in the hospital’s third-party reserve
score Rit. A hospital’s QA score is positive if it grows its reserve at a rate faster than that
of the growth in net operating assets and negative if it grows its reserve at a slower rate
than that of the growth in net operating assets. The second measure, Qit B, compares a
hospital’s R-score to the median for the hospital sample:

Qit B =

TRit
NOAit – Industry median

TRit
NOAit

(3)

The Q-score combines these two metrics:

Qit = (0.5 x Qit A) + (0.5 x Qit B)

8

(4)

Financial assets include non-physical assets like cash, short-term investments, and minority interest on the
balance sheet.
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The Q-score does not rank hospitals on their earnings quality, but instead
indicates whether reserves and net operating assets are growing at the same rate. Both
"high" (positive) and "low" (negative) Q-scores can signify that earnings are of poor
quality. A Q-score of zero signifies good quality.
The change in estimated third party reserves measures the effect of changes in
investment on current earnings. If the effect is temporary, the quality of earnings comes
into question. Because the QA score is the change in the estimated third-party reserve
divided by total operating assets, the measure reflects the growth rate in the estimated
reserve relative to the growth rate in total operating assets. If the estimated third-party
reserve grows at the same rate as net operating assets, the score is zero. As seen in the
following example, the third party reserves divided by the net operating assets for the
prior year are subtracted from the third party reserves divided by the net operating assets
for the current year. If the reserves grow at the same rate year-over-year as the net
operating assets, QA will equal zero:

Ex.

Yr 1
10
50

Yr 2
12
60

Yr 3
14
70

Stated differently, a change in a hospital's third-party reserve is benchmarked against the
change in the hospital's net operating assets in the QA measure. The inference is that the
growth in the third-party reserve is unusual if it differs from the growth in the operating
assets.
The QB measure presumes that if a hospital's R-score, the growth in third-party
reserves relative to net operating assets, differs from the sample median, then the
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hospital's R-score will likely regress toward the sample median R-score in subsequent
periods. The part of the hospital's R-score that differs from the sample median is likely to
be temporary and some of the hospital's estimated third-party reserve will be reflected in
earnings. It is unclear before the analysis which point of reference (the hospital's priorperiod third-party reserve score or the current-period sample median score) might best
represent temporary earnings effects so the two measures, QA and QB, are weighted
equally (Penman and Zhang 2002).
Sample Selection and Description
The OSHPD categorizes nonprofit hospitals into three groups: nonprofit church
control, non-profit corporation control, and nonprofit other control. Initially, the three
groups total 2,281 nonprofit hospital-year observations during the 2001-2011 periods.
From these groups, several exclusions were applied that are consistent with prior research
(Eldenburg et al. 2011, Krishnan and Yetman 2011). Substance abuse hospitals and
psychiatric hospitals are eliminated because of their differing patient mix, services
provided, and reimbursement structures relative to general hospitals. Hospitals that filed
non-comparable financial reports as identified by the OSHPD are eliminated (Kaiser
hospitals, long-term care emphasis hospitals, Shriner’s hospitals, and state hospitals,
among others). Hospitals with fewer than 50 licensed beds are excluded due to the
unique economic nature of small-bed hospitals (Balakrishnan and Soderstrom 2005,
Krishnan et al. 2004). Finally, an additional 35 hospitals are eliminated due to
insufficient data. Data were gathered for the remaining 1,804 hospitals. The sample
reconciliation is described in Table 1.
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Table 1 Description of Sample

a

Total nonprofit church, non-profit corporation, and nonprofit other observations during FY 2001-2011
Less Psychiatric and Substance abuse hospital-year observations
b

Less Non-comparable report hospital-year observations
Less Hospital-year observations with fewer than 50 licensed beds
Less Hospital-year observations with insufficient data
Total hospital-year observations

2,281
(105)
(59)
(278)
(35)
1,804

a

Description of the sample is given in section IV of the paper.

b

OSHPD identifies non-comparable reports each year. Non-comparable reports result in data that are not comparable to information filed by
other hospitals.

Table 2 summarizes the distribution of R-scores over hospital-years. The median
of 0.036 indicates that NOA would have been 3.6 percent higher for the typical hospital if
the reserve estimation had not been created. This amounts to an average increase in net
operating assets of $485k. The mean of 0.151 indicates that the R-Scores are relatively
large for a small number of hospitals when compared with the median and upper
percentile scores.
The Q-Score median is -0.229. This indicates a large variability in the changes in
investment due to the lack of quality estimates of the third-party reserve accounts. The
scores in the upper percentiles indicate that over 40% of hospitals depressed earnings
temporarily by increasing their third-party reserves. The scores in the remaining
percentiles indicate that 85% increased earnings temporarily by lowering their third-party
reserves.
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Table 2 Distribution of Third-Party Payer Reserve Index (R-Score) and Earning
Quality Index (Q-Score) over Hospital-Years; 2001 - 2011a

Number of Firm-Years
Mean
Percentiles
99
95
90
85
60
Median
40
25
10
5
1
a

R-Score

Q-Score

1,804
0.151

1,804
-0.505

1.788
0.674
0.409
0.299
0.096
0.036
0.030
-0.023
-0.187
-0.349
-1.242

0.299
0.184
0.067
0.000
-0.157
-0.229
-0.329
-0.540
-0.990
-1.530
-4.002

R-Score and Q-Score calculations are described in Section III of the paper. T he R-Score estimates the degree
of under-statement of net operating assets from the estimation of the third-party reserve accounts. It is
measured as the third-party reserves accounts relative to recorded net operating assets.
T he Q-Score indicates the extent to which earnings are affected by the change in investment due to the lack
of quality estimates of the third-party reserve accounts. Positive Q-Scores indicate the extent to which
earnings are temporarily depressed by growth in investment in the third-party reserve accounts. Negative QScores indicate the extent to which earnings are temporarily inflated by decline in investment in the thirdparty reserve accounts.
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Analysis of the Quality of Earnings
Since the Q-score signifies temporary earnings effects, a relatively high Q-score
should indicate current return is lower than that anticipated in the future. On the other
hand, a relatively low Q-score should identify a current return that is higher than that
expected in the future. The ability of Q-scores to predict changes in core return on
operating assets is examined. Core return on net operating assets (ROA) is defined as:

Core ROAit = [Operating incomeit] / average NOAit.

(5)

Core operating income is operating income before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations. The rationale is to evaluate income that donors might identify as sustainable
income from operations. Core income in which non-operating income is excluded in
addition to the exclusion of extraordinary items and discontinued operations also is used
in the test later as a sensitivity analysis on this sample.
To conduct the analysis, hospitals are sorted in each year, 2001 – 2011 and within
the sample into equal-sized quintiles based on the core ROA each hospital reported that
year. Within each ROA group, hospitals are further divided into three equal-sized groups
based on their Q-scores. These are classified as high, medium, and low Q-score groups.
The analysis compares core ROA in the grouping year with core ROA in years prior to
and after the grouping year for each Q group. Grouping the hospitals this way controls
for the mean reversion (tendency to revert to the mean over time) in ROA as documented
in Nissim and Penman (2001). Therefore, the observed relation between changes over
time and the Q-scores does not reflect this ROA tendency.
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Table 3 summarizes the median core ROA for the three years before and three
years after the year of the grouping (Year 0) for each of these Q-score groups and for all
the hospitals as a group. The table reports the means of the medians calculated over the
10 calendar years from 2001 to 2011.
The findings reported in Table 3 and in Figure 2 suggest that, on average, Qscores are able to discriminate on future core ROA. The mean ROAs for the low-Q
groups are approximately the same as the high-Q groups' mean ROAs in Year 0 by
design. However, the mean ROA for both groups (High-Q and Low-Q) subsequently
deteriorates. Accordingly, the Q-score identifies ex ante in Year 0, hospitals with lowquality earnings whose core ROAs on average decline in future years. The Q-score
further indicates that this creation of earnings is temporary.
In Table 3 we report two groups of significance tests. In the first group, the
median differences in core ROA between Year 0 and each of the three years before and
after Year 0 are computed for the high-Q, medium-Q, and low-Q groups for each of the
10 years. The mean of these median differences over the 10 years, as well as a t-statistic
on those mean differences are reported. The t-statistics on changes in core ROA from
Year 0 indicate that the mean ROAs for the low-Q and high-Q groups in the three years
before and after Year 0 are generally statistically significantly less than that in Year 0.
The second group of t-tests reported in the table is for means of differences across
high- vs. low-Q groups' differences in core ROA (computed between Year 0 and the
relevant year). The t-statistics indicate that the mean ROAs for both Q groups
deteriorate subsequent to Year 0. This is clearly indicated in figure 2. Accordingly, the
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Q-Score identifies, ex ante in Year 0, hospitals with low-quality earnings whose core
ROAs on average decline by the next year.
Sensitivity Tests and Further Analysis
Further tests were performed to determine robustness of the definition of Core
ROA and the effect on Q Score. Core income in which non-operating income is excluded
in addition to the exclusion of extraordinary items and discontinued operations is defined
as:

Core RNOAit = [Operating income excluding non-operating incomeit]/average NOAit. (6)

Results using core RNOA are shown in Figure 3 and Table 4. These offer implications
similar to those using core ROA (Figure 2 and Table 3).
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Figure 2: Mean Core Return on Total Net Operating Assets (NOA) for High and Low Q-Score Groups
over Three Years before and after the Q-Scoring Year, Year 0
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the medium Q-Score group is the middle third, and the low Q-Score group is the bottom third of hospitals.

The Q-Score groups are formed by ranking hospitals each year by Q-Scores after sorting the hospitals by Core ROAs. The high Q-Score group is the top third of hospitals,
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Core total net operating assets (ROA) is the core operating income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations but after the provision for current and deferred taxes.

a

* Indicates significance, α = 0.05

Number of Hospitals
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q
All hospitals

-1.258

t-statistic on mean differences in changes
in Core ROA

-2.274*
0.572
0.888

t-statistic on changes in Core ROA from Year 0
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q
-0.0073

-0.0304
-0.0331
-0.0291

Differences in Core ROA
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q

Differences in changes in Core ROA
from Year 0 between High Q and
Low Q groups

0.0468
0.0522
0.0541
0.0482

-3
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q
All firms

Core ROA

Groups of Firms with High, Medium, and Low Q-Scores, 2001-2011

Table 3 Summary of Core Return on Total Net Operating Assets (NOA) in Years Relative to the Q-Scoring Year (Year 0), for
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Figure 3: Mean Core Return on Net Operating (Core ROA) for High and Low Q-Score Groups
Over Three Years Before and After the Q-Scoring Year, Year 0
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-0.0581

-3.00
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the medium Q-Score group is the middle third, and the low Q-Score group is the bottom third of hospitals.

The Q-Score groups are formed by ranking hospitals each year by Q-Scores after sorting the hospitals by Core NOAs. The high Q-Score group is the top third of hospitals,
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a
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Core net operating assets (NOA) is the core operating income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations but after the provision for current and deferred taxes.

a

Number of Hospitals
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q
All hospitals

t-statistic on mean differences in changes
in Core ROA

Differences in changes in Core ROA
from Year 0 between High Q and
Low Q groups

-0.9565

-2.81
-0.05
-6.00

13.00
0.12
9.00
0.10

-2

-2.6800

-5.81
-0.07
-9.00

Differences in Core ROA
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q

t-statistic on changes in Core ROA from Year 0
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q

10.00
0.09
6.00
0.08

-3
High Q
Medium Q
Low Q
All firms

Core ROA

Groups of Firms with High, Medium, and Low Q-Scores, 2002-2010

Table 4 Summary of Core Return on Net Operating Assets (ROA) in Years Relative to the Q-Scoring Year (Year 0), for the

Donations to Quality Analysis
To investigate whether unrestricted donations are influenced by the differential
quality of earnings indicated by the Q-score, the amount of unrestricted donations in the
sample period is observed to determine whether the amounts vary in relationship to the
Q-scores. To determine whether a significant relationship exists between unrestricted
contributions (CONT) and the Q-score, an OLS regression is applied to the following
model:

CONTit = α0 + α1 ABSQSCOREit + α2 NETINCMit + α3 CHLDNit + α4 BEDSit +
α5 TEACHit + α6 LNAGEit + α7 CMIit + α8 HHIit + α9 CSHFLWit

(6)

where ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of the Q-score, NETINCM = net income scaled
by total assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of specific care, BEDS = total number of
licensed beds, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years since
the hospital was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, HHI = HerfindahlHirshman Index, and CSHFLW = operating cash flows scaled by assets.
Teaching hospitals are defined as those belonging to the Council of Teaching
Hospitals and Health Systems (COTHS). The total number of licensed beds is the control
for size. The Hirfindahl-Hirshman Index controls for the level of local competition
(Krishnan and Yetman 2011, Newton and Thomas 2012). The case mix index based on
the OSHPD Case Mix Index files is included to control for the acuity of patients served
(Newton and Thomas 2012). The absolute value of the Q-score is used because both
positive and negative values of Q-score indicate poor quality earnings.
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Table 5 reports distributions of variables used to determine significant
relationships in model (6). The lower quartile of the absolute value of the Q-score is
0.124, indicating that less than 25% of the nonprofit hospitals report good quality
earnings. A comparison of net income and operating cash flow shows considerable
disparity indicating that nonprofit hospitals apply significant accruals.
The results in Table 6 suggest a strong relationship between the absolute value of
the Q-score (ABSQSCORE) and unrestricted donations. The positive relationship
indicates that nonprofit hospitals with poorer quality earnings receive more contributions.
This suggests that donors are misinformed by the misleading impact on earnings quality
in this regard. The results also show a negative relationship with the age of the hospital
(LNAGE) and a positive relationship with the patient mix (CMI).
Table 7 provides correlations among CONT and the independent variables. The
correlation between CONT and NETINCM is negative. This is interesting to note since it
indicates that lower net income results in greater contributions. A likely explanation is
that, though contributors are misled by poor earnings quality, they are influenced by a
lower net income. This is consistent with prior research that shows that nonprofit
hospitals are subject to a zero-profit constraint and those reporting “too much” profit
receive lower contributions (Eldenburg et al. 2011, Leone and Van Horn 2005).
Additional Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed above, nonprofit hospitals are subject to a zero-profit constraint
(Eldenburg et al. 2011, Leone and Van Horn 2005). Prior research has shown a
relationship between nonprofit hospitals that fall outside of the zero-profit benchmark
and the likelihood that they will also engage in “cost shifting” by reclassifying expenses
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from non-patient-centered to patient-centered activities (Newton and Thomas 2011). The
same research found a relationship between greater reliance on external financing
through donations and cost shifting. This research suggests that cost shifting is motivated
by a desire to obscure facts. If this is true, these managers may also be inclined to
disguise poor quality accounting or an environment that fosters poor quality accounting.
Furthermore, if poor quality accounting and cost shifting is related, is there an additional
relationship with nonprofit hospitals that rely more heavily on external financing through
donations? These potential relationships are tested in an additional analysis.
To determine if there is a significant relationship among unrestricted contributions
(CONT), cost shifters, and the Q-score, an OLS regression is applied to the following two
models:

CONTit = α0 + α1 ABSQSCOREit + α2 NETINCMit + α3 CHLDNit + α4 BEDSit +
α5 TEACHit + α6 LNAGEit + α7 CMIit + α8 HHIit + α9 CSHFLW it +
α10 COSTSHFTRS + α11 SUSPECTS

(7)

CONTit = α0 + α1 NETINCMit + α2 CHLDNit + α3 BEDSit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit +
α6 CMIit + α7 HHIit + α9 CSHFLW it + α8 ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS +
α9 ABSQ*SUSPECTS

(8)

where ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of the Q-score, NETINCM = net income scaled
by total assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of specific care, BEDS = total number of
licensed beds, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years since
the hospital was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, HHI = Herfindahl-
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Hirshman Index, CSHFLW = operating cash flows scaled by assets, COSTSHFTRS = cost
shifters, SUSPECTS = suspects, ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS = interaction between the absolute
value of Q-Score and cost shifters, ABSQ*SUSPECTS = interaction between the absolute
value of Q-Score and Suspects, and ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of Q-score.
“Suspects” are those hospitals defined by Newton and Thomas (2012) as hospitals
meeting criteria that categorize them as more likely to reclassify non-core or non-revenue
generating expenses as core or revenue-generating expenses when their profits are below
or well above the zero-profit benchmark. Newton and Thomas (2012) list nine
characteristics for the “suspect” hospitals: rural, church-related, part of a system, high
charity care, low Medicare, low Medicaid, not audited, low external fiscal fees, or high
donations. Cost shifters are those hospitals showing evidence of having exhibited cost
shifting behavior (Newton and Thomas 2012).
Table 8 provides distributions of variables used to determine significant
relationships in models (7) and (8). Tables 9 and 10 provide correlations among CONT
and the variables from models (7) and (8). The correlation between CONT and
NETINCM continues to be negative.
Table 11 provides correlations among CONT and the ABSQSCORE, SUSPECTS,
COSTSHFTERS, and other controlling variables. Significant relationships are found
among the absolute value of the Q-score, designated children’s hospitals, OSHPD case
mix index, cost shifters, and unrestricted donations. The positive relationships indicate
that nonprofit hospitals receive more contributions if they report lower quality earnings
(ABSQSCORE), are designated as caring for children (CHILD), serve a variety of patients
(CMI), are likely to shift expenses from noncore expenses to core expenses (SUSPECTS),

39

or are designated as shifting expenses from noncore expenses to core expenses
(COSTSHFTRS). The results indicate that the level of contributions has a significant
negative relationship with net income (NETINCM), the age of the hospital (LNAGE), and
nonprofit hospitals designated as teaching hospitals (TEACH).
Table 12 provides correlations among CONT and interactive effects of quality and
cost-shifting. The model includes the ABSQ* SUSPECTS and ABSQ*COSTSHFTERS
among the controlling variables. Strong positive relationships are indicated for the
interaction of the absolute value of the Q-score with suspects (ABSQ* SUSPECTS), the
interaction of the absolute value of the Q-score with cost shifters (ABSQ* COSTSHFTRS)
and the level of contributions. There are strong negative relationships among net income
(NETINCM), the age of the hospital (LNAGE), and the level of contributions. There is a
positive relationship between operating cash flows (CASHFLW) and the level of
contributions.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,735)
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Lower
Quartile

Median

Upper
Quartile

CONT

0.010

0.038

0.000

0.000

0.004

ABSQSCORE

0.492

0.844

0.124

0.256

0.569

NETINCM

-0.003

0.169

-0.043

0.016

0.058

CHLDN

0.040

0.206

0.000

0.000

0.000

292.800

203.075

137.000

235.000

384.000

TEACH

0.070

0.261

0.000

0.000

0.000

LNAGE

3.690

0.755

3.000

4.000

4.000

CMI

1.142

0.230

0.980

1.100

1.260

HHI

0.400

0.529

0.040

0.158

1.000

CSHFLW

0.076

0.200

0.025

0.073

0.126

BEDS

All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
CONT = unrestricted contributions scaled by total assets, ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of Q-score,
NETINCM = net income scaled by total assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of specific care, BEDS =
total number of licensed beds, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years since the
hospital was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, and
CSHFLW = operating cash flows scaled by assets.
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Table 6: Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Unrestricted Contributions on

Absolute Value of Q-Scores and Factors to Control for Risk 2001-2011

CONTit = α0 + α1 ABSQSCOREit + α2 NETINCM it + α3 CHLDNit + α4 BEDSit + α5 TEACHit
+ α6 LNAGEit + α7 CMIit + α8 HHIit + α9 CSHFLW it

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

Constant

Intercept

0.012

1.992*

ABSQSCORE

Absolute Value of Q-Scores

0.134

5.556**

NETINCM

Net Income

-0.041

-1.531

CHLDN

Designated Children's Hospital

0.034

0.186

BEDS

Number of Lisenced Beds

-0.026

-0.922

TEACH

Designated Teaching Hospital

-0.060

-2.194

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

-0.081

-3.231**

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

0.056

2.068*

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

-0.039

-1.600

CSHFLW

Operating Cashflow

0.035

1.320

Adjusted R Square

0.032

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Table 7: Correlations between hospital characteristic variables

1. CONT
2. ABSQSCORE
3. NETINCM

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

0.138

-0.034

0.049

-0.050

-0.051

-0.093

0.023

-0.042

0.004

-0.113

-0.088

-0.032

0.024

-0.072

-0.004

-0.001

-0.088

-0.172

0.010

0.038

-0.047

0.114

-0.175

0.409

-0.080

0.025

-0.186

0.166

-0.029

-0.172

0.449

0.158

0.303

-0.121

0.010

-0.006

0.320

-0.002

0.038

0.155

0.030

-0.039

-0.159

0.114

4. CHLDN
5. BEDS
6. TEACH
7. LNAGE
8. CMI
9. HHI

-0.175

10. CSHFLW
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
CONT = unrestricted contributions scaled by total assets, ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of Q-score, NETINCM = net income
scaled by total assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of specific care, BEDS = total number of licensed beds, TEACH =
teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years since the hospital was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index,
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, and CSHFLW = operating cash flows scaled by assets.
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,735)
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Lower
Quartile

Median

Upper
Quartile

CONT

0.010

0.038

0.000

0.000

0.004

ABSQSCORE

0.492

0.844

0.124

0.256

0.569

NETINCM

-0.003

0.169

-0.043

0.016

0.058

CHLDN

0.040

0.206

0.000

0.000

0.000

292.800

203.075

137.000

235.000

384.000

TEACH

0.070

0.261

0.000

0.000

0.000

LNAGE

3.690

0.755

3.000

4.000

4.000

CMI

1.142

0.230

0.980

1.100

1.260

HHI

0.400

0.529

0.040

0.158

1.000

SUSPECTS

0.500

0.500

0.000

0.502

1.000

COSTSHFTRS

0.220

0.412

0.000

0.213

0.000

ABSQ*SUSPECTS

0.160

0.523

0.000

0.161

0.142

ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS

0.060

0.223

0.000

0.057

0.000

CSHFLW

0.076

0.200

0.025

0.073

0.126

BEDS

All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
CONT = unrestricted contributions scaled by total assets, ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of Q-score,
NETINCM = net income scaled by total assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of specific care, BEDS =
total number of licensed beds, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years since the
hospital was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, COSTSHFTRS =
cost shifters, SUSPECTS = suspects, ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS = interaction between the absolute value of
Q-Score and cost shifters, ABSQ*SUSPECTS = interaction between the absolute value of Q-Score and
Suspects, and ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of Q-score, and CSHFLW = operating cash flows scaled
by assets.
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0.220
-0.031

-0.072

3.

-0.102

-0.077

0.081

4.

5.

-0.048

0.045

-0.112

-0.039

0.423

0.050

0.146

-0.050

-0.046

6.

-0.044

0.193

-0.173

0.003

-0.104

-0.081

7.

0.225

0.397

0.365

0.084

0.104

-0.007

0.056

8.

-0.013

0.039

-0.043

-0.174

-0.046

0.075

-0.047

-0.067

9.

0.010

0.049

-0.023

0.017

-0.007

-0.066

0.566

-0.033

-0.016

10.

-0.028

0.017

0.001

-0.066

0.050

-0.039

-0.015

-0.017

0.041

0.060

11.

-0.036

-0.043

0.012

-0.005

0.019

-0.027

-0.003

-0.007

0.008

-0.036

0.089

12.
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CONT = unrestricted contributions scaled by total assets, ABSQSCORE = the absolute value of Q-score, NETINCM = net income scaled by total
assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of specific care, BEDS = total number of licensed beds, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the
number of years since the hospital was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, CSHFLW = operating cash
flows scaled by assets, SUSPECTS = suspects, and COSTSHFTRS = cost shifters.

12. COSTSHFTRS
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

11. SUSPECTS

10. CSHFLW

9. HHI

8. CMI

7. LNAGE

6. TEACH

5. BEDS

4. CHLDN

3. NETINCM

2. ABSQSCORE

1. CONT

2.

Table 9: Correlations between hospital characteristic variables
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-0.034
-0.172

0.049

3.

-0.080

0.010

-0.050

4.

5.

-0.006

0.158

-0.186

-0.047

-0.093

6.

0.155

0.320

0.303

0.166

0.114

0.023

7.

-0.159

0.030

-0.002

-0.121

-0.029

-0.175

-0.042

8.

-0.029

0.007

-0.039

-0.004

0.049

-0.168

0.409

0.004

9.

-0.010

-0.113

0.031

-0.103

-0.031

-0.067

-0.042

0.033

0.215

10.

0.200

-0.050

-0.084

0.010

-0.019

-0.040

-0.024

-0.042

0.032

0.278

11.
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CONT = unrestricted contributions scaled by total assets, NETINCM = net income scaled by total assets, CHLDN = children’s designation of
specific care, BEDS = total number of licensed beds, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years since the hospital
was licensed, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index, HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, CSHFLW = operating cash flows scaled by assets,
ABSQ*SUSPECTS = interaction between the absolute value of Q-Score and ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS = interaction between the absolute value
of Q-Score and cost shifters.

0.449

0.025

0.038

-0.051

11. ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

10. ABSQ*SUSPECTS

9. CSHFLW

8. HHI

7. CMI

6. LNAGE

5. TEACH

4. BEDS

3. CHLDN

2. NETINCM

1. CONT

2.

Table 10: Correlations between hospital characteristic variables

Table 11: Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Unrestricted Contributions
on Absolute Value of Q-Scores, SUSPECTS, COSTSHFTRS and Factors to
Control for Risk 2001-2011
CONTit = α0 + α1 ABSQSCOREit + α2 NETINCM it + α3 CHLDNit + α4 BEDSit + α5 TEACHit
α6 LNAGEit + α7 CMIit + α8 HHIit + α9 CSHFLW it + α10 COSTSHFTRS + α11 SUSPECTS

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

Constant

Intercept

-0.007

-1.029

ABSQSCORE

Absolute Value of Q-Scores

0.213

7.524**

NETINCM

Net Income

-0.076

-2.212*

CHLDN

Designated Children's Hospital

0.074

2.583**

BEDS

Number of Lisenced Beds

-0.009

-0.281

TEACH

Designated Teaching Hospital

-0.071

-2.146*

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

-0.066

-2.212*

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

0.103

3.184**

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

-0.051

-1.801

CSHFLW

Operating Cashflow

0.040

1.188

SUSPECTS

Suspects

0.055

1.981*

COSTSHFTRS

Cost Shifters

0.102

3.685**

Adjusted R Square

0.080

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Table 12: Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Unrestricted Contributions
on Absolute Value of Q-Scores, ABSQ*SUSPECTS, ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS and
Factors to Control for Risk 2001-2011
CONTit = α0 + α1 NETINCM it + α2 CHLDNit + α3 BEDSit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit +
α6 CMIit + α7 HHIit + α9 CSHFLW it + α8 ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS + α9 ABSQ*SUSPECTS

Definition

Variable

Coefficients

t-statistics

Constant

Intercept

0.006

1.517

NETINCM

Net Income

-0.068

-2.623**

CHLDN

Designated Children's Hospital

0.043

1.755

BEDS

Number of Lisenced Beds

-0.015

-0.573

TEACH

Designated Teaching Hospital

-0.042

-1.599

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

-0.069

-2.885**

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

0.044

1.691

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

-0.005

-0.226

CSHFLW

Operating Cashflow

0.050

1.993*

ABSQ*SUSPECTS

Absolute Value of Q-Score x Suspects

0.158

6.759**

ABSQ*COSTSHFTRS

Absolute Value of Q-Score x Cost Shifters

0.249

10.717**

R2

Adjusted R Square

0.113

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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IV.

Conclusion
Though the advantages of utilizing quality accounting in the for-profit sector are

well-documented, no study has broadly examined the usefulness or properties of these
financial tools in the nonprofit hospital sector. This paper examines both the usefulness
of quality accounting in a nonprofit hospital setting and the effect of the information
reported on donations. The results of the study show that accrual estimates in nonprofit
hospitals’ third-party reserve accounts and accompanying changes in investments are
related to the quality of earnings, as evidenced by the quality metric being indicative of
future earnings. Furthermore there is evidence of a relationship between donations and
the quality of earnings.
These findings have at least two implications. First, the results provide qualified
support that earnings quality in nonprofit hospitals needs to be improved. With higher
quality information, resource allocations to nonprofit hospitals will be more efficient.
Second, this study presents a compelling argument to improve reliability and relevance
by setting accounting standards in the nonprofit hospital segment and providing an
improved method for estimating the third-party reserve accounts. The results agree with
the arguments that, while nonprofit earnings have potential information content, it cannot
be assumed that this information is necessarily informative in the same way as occurs in
for-profit companies (Keating and Frumkin, 2000).
In examining the relationship among the quality of earnings, the use of cost
shifting, and the level of contributions, it is clear that managers of nonprofit hospitals are
concerned with the bottom line, though likely not in the same way as in the for-profit
sector. It appears that the focus of the concern in the past has been at the expense of the
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quality of estimating the third party reserves and, hence, the quality of earnings. By
considering the additional practice of shifting non-core expenses, the complexity of the
issue comes to light. With the impetus on nonprofit hospitals to maximize their
efficiency and utilization of investments due to reimbursement changes by CMS, this
issue needs to be effectively addressed.
There is a need for further research on ways that nonprofit financial information
can be shared sooner and more broadly. An initiative aimed at activating stakeholders to
press for changes in nonprofit accountability is warranted. Improving the nonprofit
hospital sector’s accountability system could lay a strong foundation for building the trust
to assist nonprofit hospitals’ growth, quality of services, accountability, and advance
efficient resource allocation. With the added uncertainty of revenues received from
services performed for third-party payers, complete knowledge and reliance on the
quality of the financial reports is imperative to hospital managers and decision-makers.
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CHAPTER 3
HEALTHCARE REFORM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MARKET
I.

Introduction
The passage of the PPACA in March 2010 is anticipated to have an economic

effect on both consumers and strong significance companies in the healthcare industry.
Health care stocks make up 11.5 percent of the S&P 500. Did the stock market consider
the passage to convey important information? The intent of this paper is to determine
whether market participants in the aggregate perceive the passage of this law as
information to be incorporated into equilibrium share prices of healthcare entities. A
second objective is to determine whether various areas of the healthcare industry are
affected differently, or if the law is considered to be more informative to some areas of
the healthcare industry than to other areas of the healthcare industry, i.e. hospitals or
healthcare insurers.
When President Obama signed the PPACA into law, the U.S. healthcare system
was fundamentally changed. This act is aimed at decreasing the number of insured
Americans, reducing the overall costs of health care, improving efficiencies, encouraging
innovation, and improving healthcare outcomes in the United States. However, the
legislation is quite complex, with a considerable mixture of uncertainty and trepidation
surrounding its implementation. For example, some provisions can be expected to
benefit healthcare firms while others can be expected to harm them. The bill requires
most U.S. citizens to have health insurance, either through purchasing private insurance
or through a government program, or else pay a penalty. Employers with more than 50
employees are required to contribute toward their employees’ health insurance or face
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fines. Since these provisions increase the number of privately insured individuals in the
country, one might expect this to benefit insurers. In the past, the insurance world has
been plagued with a phenomenon known as “adverse selection.” Relatively healthy
people have had incentive not to choose health insurance, while sick people have rushed
to buy insurance only when they need it. This scenario has been detrimental to insurer
earnings. Requiring healthy people as well as the sick to carry insurance is designed to
lower the average cost of health insurance. On the other hand, health insurance
companies (a) are required to pay full cost for many preventive services, (b) can no
longer exclude or charge premiums based on pre-existing conditions, and (c) soon will be
required to pay out 85% of the premium dollars collected in claims or be forced to mail
rebate checks to customers.
Some provisions of the PPACA can be expected to benefit pharmaceutical firms
as well as harm them. Drug manufacturers might expect demand for their products to
increase as a result of the increased number of insured consumers with a drug benefit.
However, manufacturers of branded drugs face a significant annual fee stemming from
the new law. More significantly, the PPACA requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to
provide $80 billion in savings over a decade. Part of this savings is ear-marked to fill the
Medicare Part D “doughnut hole” between $2,000 and $6,154 in annual drug
expenditures, by which seniors currently are required to pay 100% of the cost of their
prescription drugs within those two amounts (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011).
Whether the PPACA is expected to have a net positive or negative effect on
healthcare firms, health insurance companies, and pharmaceutical companies, and
whether its passage is perceived to provide any information to be incorporated into
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market prices, are empirical questions that are the focus of this paper. To identify the
impact of the PPACA on healthcare stock prices, a regression-based event study is
employed focusing on dates surrounding the law’s passage. Since its constitutionality
was in question at the time of passage, an additional date when the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the PPACA also is examined.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
motivation for the study and develops the hypotheses, Section 3 presents the
methodology, and Section 4 concludes.
II.

Motivation and Development of Hypotheses

Motivation
Theory
The passage of the PPACA could result in no change, a decrease, or an increase in
healthcare firms’ stock market prices. There exists theoretical and empirical support for
each of these outcomes. In a perfect and frictionless market, theory suggests that a
mandated accounting change will have no effect on the stock market price of a healthcare
firm unless the change shifts the risk profile and expected cash flows of the firm. This is
known as the strong-form of market efficiency (Fama 1970). In strong-form efficiency,
share prices reflect all information, public and private. Proponents would argue that
informed investors were aware of the PPACA prior to passage and any effect already was
incorporated into stock prices.
Given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected
immediately in security prices. Most empirical evidence indicates that a measure of an
event’s economic impact can be constructed using security prices observed over a
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relatively short time period around the date of the event. This could result in a decrease
or an increase in healthcare firms’ stock market prices depending on whether the market
foresees the passage as positive for the firms’ performance or negative. Within the
healthcare industry, shares of some groups such as insurers may increase in value while
shares of other groups such as hospitals may decrease in value. Information asymmetry
or imperfect information also could result in an unexpected market reaction (overreaction or under-reaction to the passage). As already discussed, the PPACA is a
complex legislation emitting contradicting signals. In question are whether investors are
sufficiently informed to understand the effect passage of the act could have on the
healthcare industry and how might investors have interpreted the information at the time
of passage?
The event study approach used in this paper was first introduced by Fama et al.
(1969). It has been used and modified for over forty years to study the behavior of stock
market prices around events such as earnings announcements and changes in policy
(MacKinlay 1997, Binder 1998, Kothari and Warner, 2007). The event study
methodology has since become the standard method of measuring security price reaction
to various events or announcements. Two major reasons for conducting event studies are
to test the null hypothesis that the market efficiently incorporates information and to
examine the impact of some event on the wealth of the firm’s security holders (Binder,
1998).
Fama et al. (1969) examine the effect of the announcement of a stock split on
stock prices by estimating over some period of time the parameters of the following
market model for each stock in the sample:
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Rit = αi + ƁiRmt + it

The cumulative average abnormal return from month S1 to month S2 is given by
S2

CAARs1S2 = Ʃ AAR3
S=s1

MacKinlay (1997) reviews and summarizes event study methods in accounting
and finance research. The author describes an event study as one that measures the
impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. Examples of event studies that have
been applied to firm-specific and economy wide events include earnings announcements,
issues of new debt or equity, and announcements of macro-economic variables such as
the trade deficit. MacKinlay discusses applications that use common equity. He begins
with a discussion of one possible procedure for conducting an event study, details
measuring the normal performance, and provides the necessary tools for calculating an
abnormal return, making statistical inferences about these returns, and aggregating over
many event observations.
Several potential problems can occur in hypothesis testing that must be addressed
in event studies. Frequently, the abnormal return estimators are not independent or they
do not have identical variance. This can result in issues with heteroskedasticity and
dependence. King (1966) shows that for firms in related industries (as in this paper),
market model residuals are contemporaneously correlated. Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker
(1974) note that the market model prediction errors for different firms do not have
identical variance and may not be independent across firms.
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To tackle this problem, Jaffe utilizes a portfolio method. First, the average
abnormal return (AAR) is calculated for all firms that experience an event during
calendar month t. A time series estimate of the standard deviation of AARt based on the
AAR estimates for the preceding k months is calculated for this portfolio. The AARt is
then standardized by dividing by the estimated standard deviation. A series of
standardized average abnormal return (SAARt) estimates are produced by repeating this
procedure for every sample calendar month that contains at least one event.
When the estimated abnormal returns for the sample firms are used as the
dependent variable in a regression with firm specific variables on the right-hand side,
there again can be heteroskedastic and correlation issues. Collins and Dent (1984)
propose a generalized least squares technique applicable when the event time is the same
as the calendar time.
In event studies, as pointed out in econometrics literature (Kmenta 1971), model
misspecification always is a problem. Omitting relevant variables or including irrelevant
variables results in misspecification. This can be particularly true when there is too small
a sample, securities are related, or event dates are clustered in calendar time. An
extensive examination of event study techniques is conducted by Brown and Warner
(1985). They use three general methods to estimate abnormal returns: mean-adjusted
returns, market-adjusted returns, and market- and risk-adjusted returns. Brown and
Warner find similar results when the same calendar month is designated as the event
month for each security (the event months are “clustered” in calendar time) as those
obtained when there is no clustering.
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Similarly, Dyckman et al. (1984) and Brown and Warner (1985) examine the
usefulness of the event study methodology when daily stock returns are used. Meanadjusted returns, market-adjusted returns, and market model prediction errors are
examined in both studies. These studies find that the different abnormal return measures
perform similarly with daily return data. That is, these results indicate that event studies
with daily returns perform at least as well as those with monthly returns.
In the only previous study that attempted to address the effects of the PPACA,
prior to its passage, Al-Ississ and Miller (2011) looked at the unexpected election of
Republican Scott Brown for Massachusetts Senator, as a harbinger of the healthcare bill
not passing. The study used test windows of (-2, +1) and (-2, +7) surrounding Brown’s
election to gauge the market’s response to the prospect that the bill would not pass. The
results were mixed.
Hypothesis Development
As discussed in the introduction, healthcare insurers and pharmaceutical
companies are presented with both beneficial and harmful provisions with the passage of
the PPACA. The expected impact of the passage of the law is ambiguous and
determining the effect is a major purpose of this paper.
Other areas of the healthcare industry, including hospitals, participants in
government programs such as Medicaid Managed Care and Medicare Advantage, and
medical device manufacturers have a more clear-cut expectation of the effect on
performance.
The effect on hospitals should be beneficial, at least initially. The PPACA allows
hospitals a way to recoup many of the costs incurred when uninsured patients come in for
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treatment by substantially reducing the number of uninsured people in the country. This
will benefit hospitals two ways. First, insured consumers tend to use more healthcare
services than the uninsured. The uninsured are four times more likely to delay or forego
needed care than the insured. When they do seek the necessary care, the uninsured
typically are sicker and require more expensive treatments. Delaying or forgoing needed
care can lead to more serious health problems, making the uninsured more likely to be
hospitalized for avoidable conditions and still unable to pay for any of the treatments
(Kaiser 2008). Second, the additional 32 million Americans added to the rolls of the
insured are expected to drastically reduce the amount of uncompensated care that
hospitals are required to provide. Uncompensated care is financed through various
sources, but a large percentage falls on the hospitals to write off as charity care or bad
debt. Of the $57.4 billion of uncompensated care in 2008, public funds financed as much
as $42.9 billion, about 75 percent, with the other $14.5 billion remaining as unpaid or
“charity” care (Holahan and Garrett 2010).
The effect on medical device manufacturers is expected to be negative. The
PPACA includes a $20 billion medical device tax. The tax is based on a 2.3 percent
excise tax that will be levied on total revenues of a company, regardless of whether a
company generates a profit, starting in 2013. The “innovation tax” is supposed to be
offset due to an increased pool of insured beneficiaries receiving treatment. However,
many investors feel that some companies will owe more in taxes than they generate from
their operations. The result could be injurious to innovation, patient care and job creation
(Behl et al. 2010).
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For companies that focus on patients who receive Medicaid such as Centene,
Amerigroup and Molina Healthcare, the expectation is that passage of the PPACA will be
positive. Medicaid expansion under the healthcare reform laws could add millions of
participants to the program over the next nine years. The Urban Institute for the Kaiser
commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured estimates that Medicaid enrollment will
increase by 15.9 million participants by the year 2019. Those companies with greater
Medicaid Managed Care involvement should gain additional benefit with the passage of
the PPACA.
Compounding the uncertainty regarding the market impact of the PPACA is the
fact that, even as the law was enacted, there existed considerable uncertainty as to the
constitutionality of the law itself. It follows then that the market reaction at the time of
passage might be partial or incomplete. A secondary, or closure, effect also is possible at
the time the Supreme Court upheld the law’s constitutionality. This occurred on June 28,
2012.
To fully assess investor response to information events, all information dates
associated with the date of passage should be considered. This is particularly difficult
when observing an event like the passage of a law, since there are public news items
preceding the actual vote and signing of the law. Figure 4 charts a timeline for the events
preceding the passage of the PPACA. The critical dates in terms of event testing are
shown in red. Other milestones leading up to the critical dates are described below
(Sarlin, 2010; Ambinder, 2010) and are shown in green in Figure 4.
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With Scott Brown’s upset victory in the Massachusetts Senate race in January
2010, many analysts and even House Democrats believed the House would never pass the
Senate bill. The victory was interpreted to be a public stand against a healthcare bill.
The first hint of trouble for the Republicans came shortly after the election in January
2010 with the Supreme Court ruling Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.9 In
this landmark case, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the
government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporations and
unions. This ruling kindled a fire that progressives used to press the White House and
Democratic leadership to unite.
In February 2010, three events occurred that further unified the Democratic
leadership toward passage of a healthcare bill. First, a Republican from Kentucky, Jim
Bunning, blocked Senate action needed to prevent an estimated 1.2 million American
workers from prematurely losing their unemployment benefits. Though the extension
eventually passed, the backlash against the Republicans in the Senate was strong. The
Democrats were grateful for this example of the consequences of Republican
obstructionism.
Second, Sen. Al Franken challenged White House senior adviser David Axelrod
at a private Democratic retreat for the administration’s failure to provide clarity or
direction on the healthcare and the other big bills it wants Congress to enact. This
challenge impressed Axelrod enough to reinvigorate his determination to unite the
Democrats and focus on passing a health care bill.
Third, several big-name insurance companies announced rate hikes in insurance
premiums for their customers without valid reasoning. The White House quickly seized
9

558 U.S. 310 (2010) Citizens United, Appellant v. Federal Election Commission
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on the news as proof reform was urgently needed. The increase helped spur the
Democrats to continue to push for quickly passing a health care bill. This led to House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Mr. Obama working out details on a common health care
reform bill, allowing President Obama to begin to lobby wavering lawmakers
individually.
The event that a priori seemed most suggestive of the bill eventually passing
occurred in the beginning of March, 2010. Majority Leader Harry Reid had managed to
line up 52 Democratic senators who promised, in writing, to support the House
reconciliation bill no matter the consequences. Harry Reid sent a letter to Senate
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell explaining the path that the Senate Democrats had
taken to secure bipartisan support for health reform. Reid said that he would seek a
majority vote to revise the health reform bill and reiterated the commitment of Senate
Democrats to deliver a meaningful health reform act.
In analyzing the events immediately preceding the passage of the PPACA, some
analysts believe that passage of the law was leaked when news of the letter written by
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on March 11, 2010 to Senate Minority Leader
McConnell became public. It seems likely that this additional information date associated
with the passage of the law is potentially important in assessing the informational impact
of the law.
As stated above, the overall impact of the passage and subsequent ruling backing
the law is ambiguous ex ante. Accordingly, the first, second, and third hypotheses tested,
stated in null form are:
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H1: The release of the letter written by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to
Senate Minority Leader McConnell on March 11, 2010, had no effect on
the market for healthcare firms.
H2: The passage of the PPACA on March 21, 2010, had no effect on the market
for healthcare firms.
H3: The Supreme Court ruling on June 28, 2012, had no effect on the market for
healthcare firms.
A second objective is to determine whether different areas of the healthcare
industry are affected differently, or if the law is considered to be more informative to
some areas of the healthcare industry than to other areas of the healthcare industry. The
third hypothesis tested, again stated in null form is:
H4: The three events related to the passage of the PPACA had no differential
effect among the types of healthcare firms.
III.

Methodology and Results

Data
The study examines all healthcare industry firms traded on the NYSE and
NASDAQ exchanges that are part of the S&P Total Market Index (SPTMI) with a total
return available from January 2010 through August 2012. There are a total of 957 firms
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database (CRSP 2010). This
sample is screened to exclude firms for which significant events other than the passage of
the PPACA and Supreme Court ruling were reported during the two-week periods
surrounding both the passage of the PPACA and the Supreme Court ruling. A firm is
classified as belonging to the healthcare industry based on its S&P Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS) code. In particular, a firm is classified as belonging to the
healthcare industry if its two digit GICS code is 35. The GICS codes are acquired from
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COMPUSTAT and cross-matched to the returns data based on their Committee on
Uniform Security Procedures (CUSIP) codes.
Of the 957 firms that were classified as healthcare, only those 719 firms that are
traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ were included. Price information for each of the
candidate stocks was retrieved from Yahoo Finance (available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=IWV+Historical+Prices) . Of firms initially selected,
35 firms were removed due to missing or incomplete data, leaving a final sample of 684
healthcare firms. The sample reconciliation is described in Table 13.

Table 13 Description of Sample

a

Total healthcare firms (GICS 35)
Less firms not traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
Less firms with insufficient data
Total firms
a

957
(238)
(35)
684

Description of the sample is given in section IV of the paper.

Market Adjusted Returns Analysis
In an initial examination of the three event dates, the analysis examines abnormal
returns in response to the events by defining abnormal returns as the difference between
healthcare industry returns and returns of the market as a whole. Following methodology
described in Brown and Warner (1985) and MacKinlay (1997), test statistics are
calculated to test the null hypothesis that abnormal returns are zero over the test window.
Specifically, this analysis finds Market Adjusted Returns by calculating the difference
between the return of an equally weighted portfolio of healthcare stocks and the S&P 500
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index. For the market adjustment, the market is first defined as the S&P 500, but to avoid
the possibility that the market reaction of these relatively large firms might differ
systemically from other firms, a second comparison is made with the S&P total index.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 plot the cumulative market adjusted returns for the three
information events on an event window of -10,+10 trading days surrounding each event.
In Figure 3, two of the event dates overlap, so the earlier March 11 date is indicated as 7
trading days prior to the March 21st date zero.
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March 11th – Reid
Letter Date
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The test statistic used to measure abnormal returns is calculated by dividing the
cumulative abnormal return for the portfolio by the standard deviation of the estimation
period returns. Consider the event window that starts at relative date ‘j’ and ends at date
‘k’, with the event occurring at t=0 and j<0<k. The test statistic, as given in Brown and
Warner 1985, is then:

=
Where:
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The S&P data are retrieved from Yahoo Finance. Brown and Warner use a 239
day estimation period for the calculation of the test statistic’s standard deviation. This
same estimation period is used when calculating the standard deviation for the test
statistics calculated in this paper. For this reason, data were retrieved from February 1,
2009 to August 2012 to allow sufficient observations for the estimation periods.
As documented by Brown and Warner (1985), this type of test is inherently
problematic for situations in which an event window is used rather than a single event
day in calculating the t-statistic. Brown and Warner point out that the two issues with the
t-statistic involve the number of iterations and the number of days in the event window.
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Since the number of iterations for this analysis is n=1, significance will be difficult to
show. As the number of days in the event window increases, it is even less likely that
significance will be shown.
T-statistics from the analysis are shown in Table 14. Although the CARs charted
in Figures 5, 6, and 7 seem to indicate a positive response to each of the three events,
consistent with the expectations suggested by Brown and Warner for this type of analysis,
none of the event windows shows significance.

Table 14: T-Statistics for Significance of CARs
Event Windows
Single Day

-5,+5

-2,+1

-2,+7

March 11 , 2010
S&P 500 March 21st, 2010
June 28th, 2010

0.899
0.67
0.93

-0.013
-0.013
0.099

0.04
0.057
-0.045

0.014
0.005
0.071

S&P Total March 11th, 2010
Market March 21st, 2010
Index
th
June 28 , 2012

0.898

-0.015

0.034

0.014

0.617
0.908

-0.008
0.089

0.061
-0.056

0.009
0.06

th

The T-statistics are presented for each of the event windows tested for the three events. The
th

st

June 28 event is the upholding of the healthcare bill by the Supreme Court. The March 21
th

event is the passage of the healthcare bill by congress. The March 11 event is the Harry Reid
Letter to Mitch McConnell. T-statistics are calculated according to Brown and Warner (1985).
The estimation period for the calculation of standard deviation is 239 days as computed in Brown
and Warner (1985). The first panel shows t-stats for abnormal returns calculated using the S&P
500 index. The second panel shows t-stats for abnormal returns calculated using the S&P Total
market index.
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Two-Step Fama-French Regression
To remedy the empirical shortcomings of the market adjusted returns analysis, the
next stage of the examination of the impact of the passage of the healthcare bill on the
healthcare industry uses a two-step regression method to measure abnormal returns. The
basic approach involves comparing firms’ actual returns during the event window(s) with
their predicted return based on known risk factors. First, the Fama-French regression is
conducted by industry over the estimation window of five years before the event window
using daily data retrieved from CRSP. The general form of the model takes the form of:

,
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+

+

+
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(10)

where RFt is the risk-free rate of return on day t, Ri,t is the return of industry i at time t,
SMBt is the difference in returns between small and big capitalization firms on day t, and
HMLt is the difference in returns between high and low book to market firms on day t.
The Fama-French model (Fama and French 1992; 1993) predicts the firm’s return
on any given day based on the association between the firm’s return and the return on the
market portfolio. Two other risk factors that have been shown to influence equity returns
also are incorporated into the model (the return on stocks with small and large market
capitalization and the difference between the return on stocks with high and low book-tomarket value). This form of the Fama-French regression is estimated over the estimation
period. The parameter estimates generated by this model are used to calculate abnormal
returns over the event window by using the SMB, HML, and the difference between
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market and risk free rate of return. The stock’s abnormal return is the portion of the
return that cannot be accounted for by these known risk factors.
The abnormal returns over the event window are summed to create a cumulative
abnormal return (CAR). A regression is conducted on these data to whether the
healthcare firms have a mean CAR over the event window different from all other firms
in the CRSP data base. This estimation is conducted on both a long window (-5, +5) and
a short window (-2, +2). The regression for the calculated CARs takes the form:

=

+

+

(11)

where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return over the event window for industry i, Dj is
a dummy variable for industry j, βj is the coefficient on the dummy variable for industry
j, and n is the number of industry dummies calculated.
Results are conducted using both an equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio
for the healthcare industry. An equal-weighted portfolio considers every stock in the
index to have equal-weight regardless of the size of the company. A value-weighted
portfolio assigns a weight proportional to the market capitalization of each company.
Due to their proximity, the same estimation period is used for the two 2010 events
(March 11 and March 21). However, to prevent the March 11th event from influencing
the estimation of the parameters for the March 21st event, the estimation period ends on
March 4th in estimating parameters for both the March 11th and March 21st event.
As shown in Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18, results from the two-stage regressions
indicate positive abnormal returns for healthcare firms around both the March 11 th and
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March 21st event windows. The mean CAR over the event windows for healthcare firms
is significantly different than those of other industries. For the March 11 th event date, the
healthcare variable is positive and significant at p < .01 for both event windows for both
the value weighted and equal weighted portfolios. This provides strong evidence that the
healthcare industry viewed the Harry Reid letter of March 11th foretelling the law’s
passage as positive information. For the March 21st date, enactment of the new law, the
longer event window (-5, +5) shows positive significant CARs for healthcare firms for
both the value weighted and equal weighted portfolios. For the short window (-2, +2),
however, the second date returns are not significant for the equally weighted portfolio,
but marginally so (p = .079) for the market weighted portfolio.
The third event date is June 28, 2012, the day the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the PPACA. Although the cumulative market adjusted returns in
Figure 4 would suggest a positive reaction on that date, this study was unable to confirm
or reject that implication. CRSP data needed to conduct the two-step Fama-French
regression used for the other two dates is not currently available for the June 26, 2012,
event windows.
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Table 15: Difference in healthcare portfolio, Value-weighted, March 11th
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry

-0.016
0.015

Adjusted R-Square

Standard
Error
0.001
0.004

P-value
0.000
0.008***

0.472

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.000***

-0.019
0.026

Adjusted R-Square

Standard
Error
0.004
0.013

P-value
0.000
0.080*

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.003
0.000
0.003
0.000**

0.203

The results are from a regression conducted on the residuals of a Fama-French regression. The Fama-French regression is
conducted on industry portfolios. An indicator variable is then created for the healthcare and financial industries based on the
SIC classification. These regressions are value weighted in both the -5+5 and the -2+2 event windows. Heteroscedasticconsistent standard error and p-values are reported along with uncorrected standard error and p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<.05,
*p<0.1

Table 16: Difference in healthcare portfolio, Value-weighted, March 21st
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry

-0.011
0.005

Adjusted R-Square

Standard
Error
0.001
0.004

P-value
0.000
0.259

-0.06

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry
Adjusted R-Square

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001***

0.002
-0.006

Standard
Error
0.003
0.01

P-value
0.532
0.551

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.003
0.542
0.003
0.055*

0.038

The results are from a regression conducted on the residuals of a Fama-French regression. The Fama-French regression is
conducted on industry portfolios. An indicator variable is then created for the healthcare and financial industries based on the
SIC classification. These regressions are value weighted in both the -5+5 and the -2+2 event windows. Heteroscedasticconsistent standard error and p-values are reported along with uncorrected standard error and p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<.05,
*p<0.1
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Table 17: Difference in healthcare portfolio, Equal-weighted, March 11th
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry

-0.014
0.012

Adjusted R-Square

Standard
Error
0.002
0.007

P-value
0.000
0.098

0.175

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.002
0.000
0.002
0.000***

-0.015
0.022

Adjusted R-Square

Standard
Error
0.004
0.015

P-value
0.006
0.18

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.004
0.005
0.004
0.000***

0.089

The results are from a regression conducted on the residuals of a Fama-French regression. The Fama-French regression is
conducted on industry portfolios. An indicator variable is then created for the healthcare and financial industries based on the SIC
classification. These regressions are value weighted in both the -5+5 and the -2+2 event windows. Heteroscedastic-consistent
standard error and p-values are reported along with uncorrected standard error and p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<.05, *p<0.1

Table 18: Difference in healthcare portfolio, Equal-weighted, March21st
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry

-0.01
0.003

Adjusted R-Square

Standard
Error
0.001
0.005

P-value
0.000
0.481

-0.093

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Industry
Adjusted R-Square

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.024**

-0.001
-0.003

Standard
Error
0.003
0.012

P-value
0.686
0.805

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.003
0.672
0.003
0.379

-0.044

The results are from a regression conducted on the residuals of a Fama-French regression. The Fama-French regression is
conducted on industry portfolios. An indicator variable is then created for the healthcare and financial industries based on the SIC
classification. These regressions are value weighted in both the -5+5 and the -2+2 event windows. Heteroscedastic-consistent
standard error and p-values are reported along with uncorrected standard error and p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<.05, *p<0.1
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Differential Effect of the PPACA Within the Healthcare Industry
A secondary objective of the paper is to determine whether all areas of the
healthcare industry are affected equally, or if the law is considered to be more
informative to some areas of the healthcare industry than to other areas of the healthcare
industry, i.e. hospitals or healthcare insurers. The GICS sub-sectors are tested separately
for abnormal returns using the market adjusted return methodology employed earlier for
the examination of the difference between healthcare industry returns and returns of the
market as a whole (Table 14). Results for the sub-sectors are shown in Tables 19 and 20.
The sub-sector t-statistics do not reveal a strong pattern of significance in abnormal
returns. The results from calculating t-statistics over the estimation windows are
consistent with the findings in Brown and Warner (1985). Brown and Warner show that
the power of the t-statistic decreases dramatically when an event window is used rather
than a single event day in calculating the t-statistic. As pointed out by Brown and
Warner, the two issues with the t-statistic involve the number of iterations and the
number of days in the event window. Since the number of iterations for this analysis is
n=1, significance will be difficult to show. As the number of days in the event window
increases, it is even less likely that significance will be shown. This helps explain why
the only significance found in the sub-industries is on the Single Day event window.
Of the sub-sectors, Healthcare Services, Healthcare Facilities (including
hospitals), Managed Healthcare (including health insurers), and Pharmaceuticals all
showed significance at p<.10 for at least one of the event dates.
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TABLE 19: T-Statistics for Significance of CARs, S&P Total Market Index
Single Day
Health Care Equipment
including Medical Devices

EVENT WINDOWS
-5, +5
-2, +1

-2, +7

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.197
-0.047
-0.341

-0.113
-0.098
0.154

0.018
0.279
-0.265

-0.058
0.094
0.012

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.740
-0.106
0.033

-0.165
-0.154
0.466

-0.043
0.119
-0.051

-0.163
0.077
0.551

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.227
0.494
0.193

-0.228
-0.061
0.488

-0.231
0.220
-0.405

-0.089
0.029
0.140

Health Care Supplies

Health Care Distributors

Health Care Services

Healthcare Facilities
including Hospitals

Managed Healthcare
including Health Insurers

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.792
1.661 **
1.201

0.180
0.184
0.390

0.428
0.693
-0.024

0.342
0.275
0.103

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.225
2.015 ***
1.929 **

0.126
0.238
0.425

0.002
0.292
0.563

0.278
0.031
0.502

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.773
0.237
1.317 *

0.036
0.164
-0.378

-0.121
0.647
-0.637

0.160
0.213
-0.302

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.529
-0.919
0.590

0.089
-0.001
0.312

0.087
0.103
0.518

0.117
0.026
0.272

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.234
-0.199
-1.040

-0.063
-0.050
0.643

0.300
0.165
-0.578

-0.028
-0.089
0.511

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.166
1.335 *
-0.766

-0.081
-0.012
0.538

-0.008
0.146
-0.130

0.031
0.147
0.328

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.876
-0.434
-0.595

-0.121
-0.188
0.151

0.005
-0.234
-0.312

-0.220
-0.142
-0.060

Healthcare Technology

Biotechnology

Pharmaceuticals

Life Sciences Tools & Services

The T-statistics are presented for each of the event windows tested for all three events. TheMarch 11th event is the Harry Reid
Letter to Mitch McConnell. The March 21st event is the passage of the healthcare bill by congress. The June 28th event is the
upholding of the healthcare bill by the Supreme Court. The GICS sub-industries are presented with separately calculated test
statistics. T-statistics are calculated according to Brown and Warner (1985). The estimation period for the calculation of standard
deviation is 239 days as computed by Brown and Warner (1985), ending with the day before the event window begins. *** p<0.025,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 20: T-Statistics for Significance of CARs, S&P 500
Single Day
Health Care Equipment
including Medical Devices

EVENT WINDOWS
-5, +5
-2, +1

-2, +7

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.226
0.097
-0.341

-0.109
-0.121
0.219

0.041
0.284
-0.210

-0.052
0.078
0.077

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.765
0.022
0.033

-0.160
-0.173
0.499

-0.020
0.118
-0.001

-0.157
0.062
0.585

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.209
0.641
0.193

-0.226
-0.081
0.548

-0.215
0.220
-0.364

-0.083
0.012
0.196

Health Care Supplies

Health Care Distributors

Health Care Services

Healthcare Facilities
including Hospitals

Managed Healthcare
including Health Insurers

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.820
1.805 **
1.201

0.187
0.166
0.423

0.451
0.695
0.024

0.351
0.260
0.150

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.237
2.059 ***
1.929 **

0.126
0.213
0.435

0.023
0.281
0.565

0.274
0.015
0.510

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.763
0.318
1.317 *

0.040
0.154
-0.335

-0.110
0.649
-0.587

0.165
0.204
-0.259

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

0.550
-0.817
0.590

0.095
-0.017
0.347

0.104
0.102
0.554

0.124
0.012
0.311

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.211
-0.064
-1.040

-0.058
-0.069
0.651

0.320
0.163
-0.501

-0.021
-0.106
0.531

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.142
1.502 *
-0.766

-0.076
-0.034
0.598

0.016
0.146
-0.073

0.039
0.129
0.392

March 11, 2010
March 21, 2010
June 28, 2012

-0.852
-0.291
-0.595

-0.114
-0.207
0.199

0.005
-0.235
-0.261

-0.220
-0.159
-0.007

Healthcare Technology

Biotechnology

Pharmaceuticals

Life Sciences Tools & Services

The T-statistics are presented for each of the event windows tested for all three events. TheMarch 11th event is the Harry Reid
Letter to Mitch McConnell. The March 21st event is the passage of the healthcare bill by congress. The June 28th event is the
upholding of the healthcare bill by the Supreme Court. The GICS sub-industries are presented with separately calculated test
statistics. T-statistics are calculated according to Brown and Warner (1985). The estimation period for the calculation of standard
deviation is 239 days as computed by Brown and Warner (1985), ending with the day before the event window begins. *** p<0.025,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1

76

Due to the limitations of the market adjusted returns analysis, the Fama-French
two-step regression method also was applied to the healthcare industry sub-sectors for the
first two events for which CRSP data were available. Since CRSP data were used, the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code was used to classify the healthcare industry
sub-sectors rather than the GICS code. The five sub-sectors under the SIC code
classification are: Healthcare Equipment and Supplies, Wholesale Medical Equipment
and Supplies, Healthcare Insurers, Healthcare Clinics and Nursing Facilities, and
Hospitals.
Results for the sub-sectors using the two-step regression are shown in Tables 21,
22, 23, and 24. The analysis offers strong evidence that Hospitals and Healthcare Clinics
and Nursing Facilities experienced positive abnormal returns around the March 11th
event date. In every specification, those sub-sectors revealed positive and significant
abnormal returns. Further, Healthcare Insurers experienced positive and significant
returns in three of four specifications. Only the -5, +5 March 11th equal-weighted analysis
did not indicate significant market response.
Healthcare Equipment and Supplies and Wholesale Medical Equipment and
Supplies did not show strong evidence of positive or negative returns around the March
11th event. Taken together, the results suggest that the release of the letter written by
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to Senate Minority Leader McConnell on March 11,
2010, provided information interpreted as positive by the market for Hospitals,
Healthcare Insurers, and Healthcare Clinics and Nursing Facilities.
For the passage of the law on March 21st, Hospitals again show strong evidence of
abnormal returns. In every specification, Hospitals show a significant and positive
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abnormal return. On the other hand, other sub-sectors do not show significant results
around the March 21st date. This might explain the lower level of significance for the
healthcare industry as a whole for the -2, +2 event window reported earlier.

Table 21: March 11th by sector, Equal-weighted
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

0.015
-0.021
-0.025
-0.005
0.028
0.058

Adj. R2

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.005
0.012
0.005
0.001***
0.005
0.001***
0.005
0.292
0.005
0.000***
0.005
0.000***

0.587

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

-0.018
0.02
0.009
0.016
0.017
0.035

Adj. R2

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.004
0.001
0.004
0.001***
0.004
0.044**
0.004
0.004***
0.004
0.002***
0.004
0.000***

0.256

The results reported are the second stage of a two stage procedure. First, the Fama-French regression is conducted
by SIC industry code. Second, the residuals are tested for significant differences. This set of results uses equalth
weighted portfolios for the M arch 11 event. For sub-sectors, SIC four digit codes are used to identify healthcarerelated sub-sectors. Healthcare Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC codes 3841 through 3845. Wholesale
Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC code 5047. Healthcare Insurers corresponds to SIC codes 6321 through
6324. Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities correspond to SIC codes 8000 through 8051. Hospitals correspond
to SIC codes 8060 through 8062. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and p-values are reported. ***
p<0.025, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22: March 11th by sector, Value-weighted
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

0.015
0
-0.009
0.005
0.017
0.045

Adj. R2

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.005
0.012
0.002
0.951
0.002
0.001***
0.002
0.046**
0.002
0.000***
0.002
0.000***

0.512

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

-0.022
0.023
0.012
0.019
0.021
0.038

Adj. R2

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.003
0.012
0.003
0.000***
0.003
0.003***
0.003
0.000***
0.003
0.000***
0.003
0.000***

0.515

The results reported are the second stage of a two stage procedure. First, the Fama-French regression is conducted
by SIC industry code. Second, the residuals are tested for significant differences. This set of results uses equalth

weighted portfolios for the M arch 11 event. For sub-sectors, SIC four digit codes are used to identify healthcarerelated sub-sectors. Healthcare Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC codes 3841 through 3845. Wholesale
Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC code 5047. Healthcare Insurers corresponds to SIC codes 6321 through
6324. Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities correspond to SIC codes 8000 through 8051. Hospitals correspond
to SIC codes 8060 through 8062. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and p-values are reported. ***
p<0.025, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 23: March 21st by sector, Equal-weighted
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

-0.019
0.004
0.003
-0.003
0.003
0.059

Adj. R2

-0.294

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

-0.013
0.001
-0.001
0.003
0.003
0.059

Adj. R2

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.002
0
0.002
0.1
0.002
0.211
0.002
0.153
0.002
0.247
0.002
0.000***

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.002
0
0.002
0.597
0.002
0.749
0.002
0.088**
0.002
0.247
0.002
0.000***

0.824

The results reported are the second stage of a two stage procedure. First, the Fama-French regression is conducted
by SIC industry code. Second, the residuals are tested for significant differences. This set of results uses equalth
weighted portfolios for the M arch 11 event. For sub-sectors, SIC four digit codes are used to identify healthcarerelated sub-sectors. Healthcare Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC codes 3841 through 3845. Wholesale
Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC code 5047. Healthcare Insurers corresponds to SIC codes 6321 through
6324. Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities correspond to SIC codes 8000 through 8051. Hospitals correspond
to SIC codes 8060 through 8062. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and p-values are reported. ***
p<0.025, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 24: March 21st by sector, Value-weighted
-5+5 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

-0.012
0.001
-0.001
0.003
0.003
0.006

Adj. R2

-0.321

-2+2 window
Beta
Intercept
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies
Wholesale Equipment & Supplies
Healthcare Insurers
Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities
Hospitals

-0.021
0.005
0.004
-0.003
0.003
0.06

Adj. R2

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.002
0
0.002
0.7
0.002
0.741
0.002
0.156
0.002
0.077*
0.002
0.011***

Heteroscedasticity consistent
Standard
P-value
Error
0.002
0
0.002
0.057*
0.002
0.123
0.002
0.26
0.002
0.145
0.002
0.000***

0.808

The results reported are the second stage of a two stage procedure. First, the Fama-French regression is conducted
by SIC industry code. Second, the residuals are tested for significant differences. This set of results uses equalth
weighted portfolios for the M arch 11 event. For sub-sectors, SIC four digit codes are used to identify healthcarerelated sub-sectors. Healthcare Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC codes 3841 through 3845. Wholesale
Equipment & Supplies correspond to SIC code 5047. Healthcare Insurers corresponds to SIC codes 6321 through
6324. Healthcare Clinics & Nursing Facilities correspond to SIC codes 8000 through 8051. Hospitals correspond
to SIC codes 8060 through 8062. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and p-values are reported. ***
p<0.025, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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IV.

Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper is to explore the market reaction to the

passage of the PPACA. The passage of this Act could have a profound effect on health
insurance companies, hospitals, health savings accounts, makers of biosimilars or hybrid
pharmaceuticals, the medical profession, consumers, and investors in the various
healthcare industries. The contribution of this paper is to provide an early view of the
partial impact of the PPACA on the healthcare industry as perceived by the market and
on the overall welfare of the economy in the United States.
While the paper examines the equity markets to shed light on whether the passage
of the PPACA is expected to benefit or harm the healthcare sector, this study also
contributes to the literature by linking political events and stock market returns. The
findings of this paper extend existing literature by offering evidence of the connection
between the passage of laws and related Supreme Court rulings. In addition, the study
examines whether the market is able to differentiate among firms within a particular
sector and even among individual sub-sectors that differ in their exposure to government
programs.
The use of market adjusted returns does not show evidence of abnormal returns
around the event windows. However, when controls are included in the analysis using a
two-stage estimation method, positive and significant abnormal returns can be detected in
healthcare firms. Taken together, these results indicate that there were market reactions
in healthcare firms related to Harry Reid’s letter and the healthcare bill being passed in
the House of Representatives, with the strongest reaction occurring at the earlier event
date.
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Further research will perhaps confirm similar market reaction on the date the
Supreme Court upheld the Act’s Constitutionality. At outgrowth also might be an
analysis of the results from the presidential election on healthcare firms. One of the
campaign promises from the Republican candidate was to overturn the healthcare
legislation. The presidential election appeared to be quite close in the closing days. The
popular vote was extremely close, reported at 51% to 48% in favor of the Democratic
incumbent (http://www.cbsnews.com/election-results-2012/president.shtml). Had the
Republican candidate won, the future of the healthcare bill would have been uncertain. It
may be that there is a market reaction with respect to the healthcare bill that can be
detected here.
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CHAPTER 4
LINKING HEALTHCARE QUALITY AND THE BOTTOM LINE: WHAT
DO WE KNOW?
I.

Introduction

The Institute of Medicine defines good care as safe, effective, timely, patientcentered and efficient. This definition also reflects multiple dimensions of quality,
including organizational aspects comprised of a streamlined and coordinated care
process, timely patient care access, and a financially healthy organization. In the past,
quality requirements of hospitals have been viewed by the CEO and other top hospital
management as a compliance issue. However, the passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in March 2010 is projected to have a major impact on
how top hospital management view quality. Under PPACA, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) will link hospital payments with improvements in patient
care. Starting in October 2012, Medicare will now reward hospitals that provide high
quality care for their patients and financially penalize hospitals that are inefficient and
fail to comply with health quality standards set by the Hospital Inpatient Quality
Reporting Program.10 The new reimbursement policy combines existing fee-for-service
payments with shared savings incentive payments for achieving quality as measured by
specific performance metrics. For reimbursements to be high, the quality of care
provided by the hospitals also must be high.
When patients are managed properly and attention is given to quality care, it can
be posited that the result is a more financially sound hospital. According to Dlugacz
10

www.HealthCare.gov/news/factsheets/valuebasedpurchasing04292011b.html
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(2010), "Good care leads to good finances...If the CEO does not see that good quality
leads to good outcomes that in turn lead to a good bottom line, the organization will fail."
Is that true? The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically whether high quality
hospitals also are those that are operationally efficient. The procedures used are applied
to hospital-level quality data downloadable from a Center for Medicare and Medicaid
(CMS) website and matched to hospital accounting data from California and Washington.
Quality is measured using metrics designed to proxy the actual quality metrics defined by
the PPACA and to be used in determining hospital payments.
The new payment method by Medicare is a major concern of hospitals serving
Medicare beneficiaries today. The shift from a volume-based to a value-based healthcare
payment system will have a profound effect on many hospitals. For hospitals not
achieving performance targets and ineligible for incentives, fixed operating costs could
challenge the sustainability of the hospital. For this reason, it is imperative to understand
whether there is a relationship between a hospital’s quality of care, the costs of that care,
and the revenue improved quality of care generates. If high quality hospitals are also
those that are operationally efficient, the implementation of PPACA’s new
reimbursement policy that rewards hospital quality has the potential of not only
improving patient outcomes but also enhancing economic efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
motivation for the study and develops the hypotheses, Section 3 presents the
methodology, and Section 4 concludes.
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II.

Motivation and Development of Hypotheses

Motivation
Theory
The focus of this paper is on the quality and delivery of health care in hospital
settings. Prior research in the peer-reviewed literature that could assist hospital
management in determining the effects of various quality initiatives on profitability is
scarce. Though quality of care in hospitals is now a common topic in peer-reviewed
literature, there is little evidence actually linking cost and quality of care.
The relationship between quality and cost reduction is complex, and empirical
results from prior studies are inconsistent. This is partly due to the fact that a business
case for quality-enhancing interventions (QEIs) in health care is considered separately
from the ‘economic’ case. Leatherman et al. (2003) contrasts the ‘business’ case with the
‘economic’ case by observing that business and economic cases are most likely to deviate
when benefits from reduced morbidity and mortality do not coincide with the timing of
any financial benefits. Whether improving health care quality costs money or saves
money varies with the stakeholder’s viewpoint and the time frame examined.
Leatherman et al. explore costs and benefits to four stakeholders with different interests:
providers, purchasers and employers, individual patients, and society. The authors
conclude that changes to address these challenges require a more active role for the
public, large payers, and the government. They recommend that Medicare reward
activities that benefit patients rather than paying based on fees.
Reiter et al. (2006) offer further guidance on analyzing the business case for QEIs
in health care by attempting to standardize approaches and move the field of business
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case analysis forward. They note that operating managers in both the private sector
health care delivery organizations and government agencies charged with funding or
delivering health care services are reluctant to invest in scarce resources in QEIs that
cannot be shown to pay for themselves within a relatively short time horizon. They
maintain that this is due to the fact that managers charged with maintaining the financial
solvency of the entity are concerned with the impact of new programs in the current year.
The authors conclude that carefully conducted business case analyses can identify
financing misalignments that may be deterring organizations from making investments in
QEIs with proven social value.
Another approach to improving performance while working effectively is taken
by Minkman et al. (2007). The authors focus on the empirical evidence for improved
performance by the implementation of the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award (MBQA)
criteria, the European Foundation Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence Model and
the Chronic Care Model. They conduct a systematic literature review from 1995 to May
2006 in the Pubmed, Cochrane, and ABI- databases. The authors determine not only that
patient outcome measures must be managed and improved, but also that worker’s
satisfaction and organizational and financial performance be improved as well. The
authors point out that the Institute of Medicine (2001) defines good care as not only safe,
effective, timely, patient-centered and efficient, but also includes a streamlined care
process, good access, and a financially healthy organization in the definition. Minkman
et al. do not find any of the models studied sufficient for meeting all aspects of this
definition.
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Others who have examined the relationship between costs and quality have
focused on different metrics. Fisher, et al. (2003) examine the intensity of clinical
services use during episodes of care and found that higher costs are associated with lower
quality of care. The authors select patients hospitalized between 1993 and 1995 for hip
fracture, colorectal cancer or acute myocardial infarction as well as a representative
sample drawn from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey from 1992 – 1995. Their
outcome measurements are content of care (i.e., frequency and type of services received),
quality of care (i.e., use of aspirin after acute myocardial infarction), and access to care
(i.e., having a usual source of care). The authors find that baseline health status is similar
across regions of differing spending levels, but patients in higher-spending regions
receive approximately 60% more care. Quality of care in higher-spending regions is no
better on most measures and is worse for several preventive care measures. Access to
care in higher-spending regions also is approximately the same.
Baicker and Chandra (2004) find that a state’s overall performance on quality
metrics is inversely related to its per capita Medicare spending. The authors explore the
determinants of state spending and quality using generalized least squares regressions
weighted by the size of the Medicare population in each state. To assess the underlying
sickness of state populations, they use a subset of four quality measures that were
available from Medicare claims data for 1995 and 1999. The authors then analyze the
relationship between changes in the use of these quality measures and changes in
spending within each state. Baicker and Chandra conclude that the negative relationship
may be driven by the use of intensive, costly care that crowds out the use of more
effective care. They observe that states with more general practitioners use more
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effective care and have lower spending while those with more specialists have higher
costs and lower quality.
Jha et al. (2009) examine the average risk-adjusted costs of caring for Medicare
patients in U.S. hospitals and find a wide range of results across hospitals. Risk-adjusted
costs are determined by linking data from CMS Hospital Cost Reports from one year
(2002) with inpatient prospective payment system (PPS) Impact File, also provided by
the CMS. The authors examine the relationship between hospitals’ risk-adjusted costs
and their structural characteristics, nursing levels, quality of care, and outcomes. They
find that U.S. hospitals with low risk-adjusted costs are more likely to be for-profit, treat
more Medicare patients, and employ fewer nurses. They find no evidence of association
between hospital cost and higher-quality care.
Medicare is the federal health insurance program that helps pay for hospital and
physician visits, prescription drugs, and other acute and post-acute services for 49 million
elderly and disabled Americans. According to CMS, hospital payments account for the
largest share of Medicare spending, and Medicare is the largest single payer for hospital
services.
Background
As illustrated in Figure 5, Medicare benefit payments are expected to total $551
billion in 2011. More than 7 million Medicare patients were hospitalized in 2009, and
many of these were hospitalized more than one time during that year. In fact, there were
more than 12.4 million inpatient hospitalizations of Medicare patients in 2009.
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Of those Medicare patients hospitalized, one in seven will experience some
"adverse" event. An adverse event is an event that is the result of patient-health care
services interaction that results in harm that is caused by errors or mistakes. This
includes any medical error that results in a preventable illness or injury while in the
hospital. One in three Medicare patients who leave the hospital today will be readmitted
within a month, and as many as 98,000 Americans die from errors in hospital care each
year. In addition to the unnecessary pain and suffering these errors cause patients,
Medicare spent an estimated $4.4 billion to care for patients harmed in the hospital in
2009. Readmissions cost Medicare an additional $26 billion in 200911.

11

See www.cms.gov/media/press/factsheet,_Friday_April 29,_2011
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CMS is taking the lead towards improving quality of care with the introduction of
pay for performance (P4P) programs that have been defined in the PPACA. The three
significant P4P programs introduced are designed to reward higher performing hospitals
(Meaningful Use and Value-based Purchasing) and penalize poorer-performing hospitals
(National Patient Safety Initiative). Hospitals performing at or below the 50th percentile
rank nationally on hospital quality and patient experience metrics can expect to see a
significant reduction in CMS payments beginning in 2012.
The Meaningful Use standards require that hospitals now demonstrate compliance
with a set of standards indicating meaningful use of health information technology.
Today, those hospitals that consistently demonstrate compliance receive incentive
payments. By October 2014, non-compliant hospitals will be assessed penalties through
an increasing reduction in their annual Medicare payments. These standards will
become more stringent over time.
In October 2012, CMS launched its Value-based Purchasing Program. This
program will determine hospital payment based on its hospital’s ranking on HCAHPS
performance relative to others nationwide. In addition, CMS introduced the National
Patient Safety Initiative (NPSI) in January 2011. Also taking effect in October 2012,
NPSI will now penalize hospitals with hospital acquired conditions (HACs) and those
with “excessive” readmission rates. The NPSI is structured to assess a penalty of six
percent of Medicare revenue beginning in October 2012. This penalty will increase to
nine percent by 2015 for hospitals with readmission rates and HACs above national
averages. (Shoemaker, 2011; The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010).
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For some hospitals, the combined impact of these P4P could leave the hospital
with no surplus to reinvest back into facility or operating needs. Figure 6 demonstrates
the possible impact of the implementation of P4P on a 200-bed community hospital. This
200-bed hospital could expect an estimated impact of nearly $6 million per year in lost
reimbursement and, if there is no change in performance, a total impact of $40 million
over five years. With implementation of P4P, commercial payers are likely to follow
Medicare in tying payment to quality. Already, commercial health plans have adopted
their own versions of payment reform, including penalties for HACs, infections, and
preventable readmissions (Deloitte Center for Health Solutions, 2011).

200-bed Community Hospital with the following performance assumptions:








Total Admissions of 14,500 per year and 50,750 patient days per year
Average DRG Payment/Discharge: $12,500
Annual Medicare Revenues equaling $72 million with market basket increases averaging
2.5% annually
o Overall Value-based Purchasing Performance Score of 24.5% based on:
 Relatively strong process of care measures performance with all but heart
failure discharge instruction ranking in mid-90% range
 HCAHPS ranking on 7 of the 8 composites are all at or below 50th
percentile national rank
3.16 falls/1,000 patient days
Heart Failure readmission rate = 25.7% on 455 discharges
Poor compliance with the Patient/Family Engagement standards of meaningful use

Considering the timelines for implementation of the various P4P programs, this 200-bed
hospital could expect an estimated impact of nearly $6 million per year in lost
reimbursement or assuming no change in performance, a total impact of $40 million over 5
years.
Figure 9 Magnitude of Impact Example
www.getwellnetwork.com/print/32
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Hypothesis development
Prior research has been limited by the lack of detailed, audited financial
information to serve as the source of the cost information. Also, unlike this paper,
previous quality metrics have not been modeled after the scoring method to be used by
CMS for the value-based incentive payments to hospitals beginning October 1, 2012. In
the for-profit corporate sector, higher quality is associated with a better bottom line.
Given a more accurate source of financial data, it stands to reason that for-profit hospitals
should also show a relationship between hospital operating performance and higher
quality of healthcare. Accordingly, the first hypothesis tested, stated in null form is:
H1: Quality of care is not related to hospital operating efficiency in for-profit
hospitals.
Unlike the corporate sector, nonprofit hospitals have no equity stakeholders. The
three primary groups of stakeholders in the nonprofit hospital sector are patients, donors
who provide charitable support, and the community that benefits directly from the
services (Keating and Frumkin 2000). The assumption is that nonprofit hospitals seek to
maximize their philanthropic objective function rather than their profit. This is in line
with the stewardship theory which posits that managers, left on their own, will act as
responsible stewards of the assets they control.
Nonprofit hospitals have social objectives, such as providing healthcare services
to the community and charity care to the indigent. Hospitals are expected to expend
available resources to maximize their objectives subject to a zero-profit constraint (Leone
and Van Horn, 2005). In contrast to the for-profit setting where earnings are used to
evaluate managers’ ability to increase firm value, hospital CEO’s are evaluated on
relevant, multifaceted data relating to performance on community, organizational and
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individual professional objectives (e.g., improving level and quality of care to the
community).
Without the emphasis on financial efficiency, it is possible that nonprofit hospitals
also are unprepared for monitoring quality of care as accurately as the corporate sector.
Accordingly, the second hypothesis tested, stated in null form is:
H2: Quality of care is not related to hospital operating efficiency in nonprofit
hospitals.
III.

Methodology and Results
Financial data are downloaded from California's Office of Statewide Health

Planning and Development (OSHPD) website12 and the Washington State Department of
Health (WDOH) Data and Statistical Support.13 These are the only two accessible data
sources with the audited comparable information required for this investigation. In
California, the OSHPD requires hospitals providing medical care in the state to supply
detailed information annually. The OSHPD, which is a department of the California
Health and Human Services Agency, collects, analyzes, and disseminates the data on
hospitals licensed in California. The information collected by OSHPD includes utilization
data (beds, days, and discharges), financial statements (balance sheet and income
statement), revenues by payer, expenses by natural classification, and payroll data by
employee classification. Financial reports filed with the OSHPD must comply with
United States GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).
In Washington, data are gathered from the hospitals’ year end reports as well as
quarterly reports required to be submitted to the WDOH. The Department of Health
12

See http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/Hospitals/AnFinanData/CmplteDataSet/index.asp
See
http://www.doh.wa.gov/DataandStatisticalReports/HealthcareinWashington/HospitalandPatientData/Hospit
alFinancialData.aspx
13
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regularly collects data from hospitals and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) on the
pre-hospital EMS system, hospital discharges, hospital financial reports, charity care and
adverse events that occur in hospitals. Year-end financial reports filed with the WDOH
must comply with United States GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).
The quality metric is modeled directly from the performance score detailed in the
CMS fact sheet on the new Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (Hospital VBP) program.
CMS recently has focused on ways to improve hospital care and reward hospitals that
provide high quality care. In fact, CMS implemented the Hospital Inpatient Quality
Reporting (Hospital IQR) program in 2003. IQR allowed participating hospitals that
report quality measurement data by the time and date specified by CMS to receive a 2%
higher annual update to their payments. CMS has published that information on the
Hospital Compare website at http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov since 2005. With the
implementation of the P4P programs, hospitals are now required to report quality
measurement data to CMS. They no longer are eligible for the 2% higher payment
update and, in fact, must “earn” the baseline payment.
The hospital VBP program takes a stronger step by tying the Medicare payment
directly to the measurement rate. This measurement rate is determined through a
performance score comprised of 12 clinical process-of-care measures and 7 patientexperience-of-care measures. The 12 clinical processes will be weighted at 70% of the
Total Performance Score (TPS). The remaining 30% will consist of the patient
experience of care measures, which is comprised of the hospital Consumer Assessment of
Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey measures.14

14

See http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/AboutData/Data-Sources.aspx
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For scoring on achievement, hospitals will be measured on the difference between
their current performance on each clinical process and the mean of all other hospitals'
performance on each clinical process. The model used in this paper focuses on the 12
clinical measurements used in the performance scoring. The 12 measurements are listed
in the Appendix. Of the 12 measurements, two were eliminated due to a lack of
consistent reporting of these processes. The following model indicates the clinical
process care measures formula (CLINC) used:

CLINCi = (AMI8Ai - AMI8AM) + (HF1i - HF1M) + (PN3Bi - PN3BM) + (SCIPInf11i SCIPInf11M) + (SCIPInf3i - SCIPInf3M) + (SCIPCard2i - SCIPCard2M) +
(SCIPVTE1i - SCIPVTE1M) + (SCIPVTE2i - SCIPVTE2i)
(12)
where M indicates the average score for the state.
To determine whether a significant relationship exists between the quality metric
(CLINC) and the net patient revenue per bed, the following model is used:

CLINCit = α0 + α1 NPRit + α2 SZE it + α3 CMIit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit +
α6 HHIit + ɛit
(13)
where NPR = daily revenue per bed, SZE = total number of licensed beds, CMI = OSHPD
Case Mix Index Files, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number of years
since the hospital was licensed and HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman.
To determine whether a significant relationship exists between the quality metric
(CLINC) and the daily operating expenses per bed, an OLS regression is applied to the
following model:
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CLINCit = α0 + α1 DOEit + α2 SZE it + α3 CMIit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit +
α6 HHIit + ɛit
(14)

where DOE = daily operating expenses per bed, SZE = total number of licensed beds,
CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the
number of years since the hospital was licensed and HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman.
To determine whether a significant relationship exists between the quality metric
(CLINC) and the net income per bed, the following model is used:

CLINCit = α0 + α1 NPIit + + α2 SZE it + α3 CMIit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit +
α6 HHIit + ɛit
(15)

where NPI = net operating income per bed, SZE = total number of licensed beds, CMI =
OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number
of years since the hospital was licensed and HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman.
Teaching hospitals are defined as those belonging to the Council of Teaching
Hospitals and Health Systems (COTHS). The total number of licensed beds is the control
for size. The Hirfindahl-Hirshman Index controls for the level of local competition
(Krishnan and Yetman 2011, Newton and Thomas 2012). The case mix index based on
the OSHPD Case Mix Index files is included to control for the acuity of patients served
(Newton and Thomas 2012). The hospitals are grouped by type (for-profit and
nonprofit).
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Sample selection and description
The OSHPD and WDOH categorize hospitals into nonprofit government control,
nonprofit other control, and for-profit control. Initially, the three groups total 943
hospital-year observations during the 2009-2011 periods. From these groups, several
exclusions were applied that are consistent with prior research (Eldenburg et al. 2011,
Krishnan and Yetman 2011). Substance abuse hospitals and psychiatric hospitals are
eliminated because of their differing patient mix, services provided, and reimbursement
structures relative to general hospitals. Hospitals that filed non-comparable financial
reports as identified by the OSHPD are eliminated (Kaiser hospitals and long-term care
emphasis hospitals among others). Finally, an additional 135 hospitals are eliminated due
to insufficient data. Data were gathered for the remaining 582 hospitals. The breakdown
of the remaining hospitals is 451 nonprofit hospitals (402 California and 49 Washington
hospitals) and 131 for-profit hospitals (129 California and 2 Washington hospitals). The
sample reconciliation is described in Table 25.

Table 25 Decscription of Sample

a

Total nonprofit and forprofit observations during FY 2009-2011
Less Psychiatric and Substance abuse hospital-year observations
b

Less Non-comparable report hospital-year observations
Less Hospital-year observations with insufficient data
Total hospital-year observations

943
(158)
(66)
(137)
582

a

Description of the sample is given in section IV of the paper.

b

OSHPD and WDOH identify non-comparable reports each year. Non-comparable reports result in data that are not comparable to information
filed by other hospitals.

Tables 26 and 27 provide distributions of variables used to determine significant
relationships in models (13), (14), and (15) for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
respectively. Tables 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 provide correlations among CLINC and the
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variables from models (13), (14), and (15) for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
respectively.

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics - Nonprofit Hospitals (N = 451)
Lower
Quartile
Variable
Mean
Std Dev
CLINC

Median

Upper
Quartile

-2.091

4.964

-3.500

0.000

1.625

NPR

1,097,598

824,786

616,317

898,597

1,253,469

DOE

923,716

460,997

613,021

875,533

1,098,791

NPI

27,646

124,452

-10,164

19,944

74,553

SZE

271.0

193.4

112.0

236.0

392.0

CMI

1.186

0.265

1.020

1.176

1.320

TEACH

0.073

0.261

0.000

0.000

0.000

LNAGE

4.058

0.438

4.000

4.190

4.000

HHI
0.253
0.430
0.001
0.092
0.133
CLINC = quality metric, NPR = daily revenue per bed, DOE = daily operating expenses per day, NPI = net
operating income per bed, SZE = total number of licensed beds, CMI = OSHPDCase Mix Index Files,
TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number years since the hospital was licensed and HHI =
Herfindahl-Hirshman.
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics - For-profit Hospitals (N = 131)
Lower
Quartile
Variable
Mean
Std Dev

Median

Upper
Quartile

CLINC

-3.328

9.935

-4.800

-0.043

2.714

NPR

689,478

741,246

388,925

589,286

832,519

DOE

619,216

391,898

386,964

561,189

785,460

NPI

49,224

126,286

-4,812

28,316

83,341

SZE

189.1

106.9

116.0

167.0

223.0

CMI

1.221

0.348

1.010

1.167

1.350

LNAGE
4.047
0.446
4.000
4.190
4.000
CLINC = quality metric, NPR = daily revenue per bed, DOE = daily operating expenses per day, NPI = net
operating income per bed, SZE = total number of licensed beds, CMI = OSHPDCase Mix Index Files,
and LNAGE = log of the number years since the hospital was licensed.

Table 28. Correlations between hospital characteristic variables.

1. CLINC
2. NPR

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.247

0.030

0.256

0.137

0.242

0.000

0.000

0.054

0.000

0.000

0.004

0.003

0.000

0.016

0.081

0.396

0.032

3. SZE
4. CMI
5. TEACH
6. LNAGE

0.217

7. HHI
CLINC = quality metric, NPR = daily revenue per bed, SZE = total number of licensed beds,
CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the number
of years since the hospital was licensed and HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman.
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Table 29. Correlations between hospital characteristic variables.

1. CLINC

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.224

0.030

0.263

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.489

0.054

0.000

0.000

0.004

0.003

0.000

0.016

0.080

0.396

0.031

2. DOE
3. SZE
4. CMI
5. TEACH
6. LNAGE

0.213

7. HHI
CLINC = quality metric, DOE = daily operating expenses per bed, SZE = total number of licensed
beds, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the
number of years since the hospital was licensed and HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman.

Table 30. Correlations between hospital characteristic variables.

1. CLINC
2. NPI

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.224

0.030

0.263

0.110

0.065

0.000

0.303

0.367

0.000

0.000

0.004

0.003

0.000

0.016

0.080

0.396

0.031

3. SZE
4. CMI
5. TEACH
6. LNAGE

0.213

7. HHI
CLINC = quality metric, NPI = net operating income per bed, SZE = total number of licensed
beds, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, TEACH = teaching hospitals, LNAGE = log of the
number of years since the hospital was licensed and HHI = Herfindahl-Hirshman.
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Table 31. Correlations between hospital characteristic variables.

1. CLINC

2.

3.

4.

5.

0.007

0.186

0.006

0.172

0.096

0.308

0.065

0.368

0.005

2. NPR
3. SZE
4. CMI

0.000

5. LNAGE
CLINC = quality metric, NPR = daily revenue per bed, SZE = total number
of licensed beds, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, and LNAGE = log
of the number of years since the hospital was licensed.

Table 32. Correlations between hospital characteristic variables.

1. CLINC
2. NPI

2.

3.

4.

5.

0.021

0.186

0.006

0.172

0.130

0.483

0.358

0.368

0.005

3. SZE
4. CMI

0.000

5. LNAGE
CLINC = quality metric, NPI = net operating income per bed, SZE =
total number of licensed beds, CMI = OSHPD Case Mix Index Files, and
LNAGE = log of the number of years since the hospital was licensed.

Tests of hypotheses
Table 33 provides the test of the first hypothesis by examining the incremental
relationship among CLINC and the NPR and other controlling variables in nonprofit
hospitals. Significant relationships are found among the daily revenue per bed (NPR),
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number of licensed beds (SZE), OSHPD case mix index (CMI), and designated teaching
hospitals (TEACH). The positive relationships indicate that a higher quality metric
(CLINC) is associated with higher daily revenue per bed, larger hospitals, and those
hospitals that serve a variety of patients in nonprofit hospitals. The negative relationship
between CLINC and TEACH indicates that a higher quality metric is associated with nonteaching hospitals.

Table 33. Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics on Absolute
Value of Daily Revenue per Bed and Factors to Control for Risk 2009-2011 Nonprofit
Hospitals
CLINCit = α0 + α1 NPRit + α2 SZEit + α3 CMIit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit
+ α6 HHIit + ɛit

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

Constant

Intercept

-8.754

-2.765**

NPR

Daily Revenue per Bed

2.268

6.060**

SZE

Number of Licensed Beds

0.004

2.070*

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

7.082

5.456**

TEACH

Designated Teaching Hospital

-0.060

-3.349**

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

-1.213

-1.753

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

0.420

0.625

Adjusted R Square

0.148

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.

Table 34 provides the test of the second hypothesis by examining the incremental
relationship among CLINC and the DOE and other controlling variables in nonprofit
hospitals. Significant relationships are found among the daily operating expenses per bed
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(DOE), number of licensed beds (SZE), OSHPD case mix index (CMI), designated
teaching hospitals (TEACH), and log of the age of the hospitals (LNAGE). The positive
relationships indicate that a higher quality metric (CLINC) is associated with higher daily
operating expenses per bed, larger hospitals, and those hospitals that serve a variety of
patients in nonprofit hospitals. The negative relationships indicate that a higher quality
metric is associated with non-teaching hospitals and newer hospitals.

Table 34. Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics on Absolute
Value of Daily Operating Expenses per Bed and Factors to Control for Risk 2009-2011
Nonprofit Hospitals
CLINCit = α0 + α1 DOEit + α2 SZEit + α3 CMIit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit
+ α6 HHIit + ɛit

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

Constant

Intercept

-5.805

-1.921

DOE

Daily Operating Expenses per Bed

4.465

6.405**

SZE

Number of Licensed Beds

0.004

2.483**

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

5.531

4.288**

TEACH

Designated Teaching Hospital

-5.675

-4.177**

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

-1.915

-2.824**

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

0.420

0.625

Adjusted R Square

0.155

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.

Table 35 provides the test of the third hypothesis by examining the incremental
relationship among CLINC and the NPI and other controlling variables in nonprofit
hospitals. Significant relationships are found among the net operating income per bed
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(NPI), number of licensed beds (SZE), OSHPD case mix index (CMI), designated
teaching hospitals (TEACH), and log of the age of the hospitals (LNAGE). The positive
relationships indicate that a higher quality metric (CLINC) is associated with higher net
operating income per bed, larger hospitals, and those hospitals that serve a variety of
patients in nonprofit hospitals. The negative relationships indicate that a higher quality
metric is associated with non-teaching hospitals and newer hospitals.

Table 35. Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics on Absolute
Value of Net Operating Income per Bed and Factors to Control for Risk 2009-2011
Nonprofit Hospitals
CLINCit = α0 + α1 NPIit + α2 SZEit + α3 CMIit + α4 TEACHit + α5 LNAGEit
+ α6 HHIit + ɛit

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

Constant

Intercept

-5.805

-1.921

NPI

Net Operating Income per Bed

1.165

4.807**

SZE

Number of Licensed Beds

0.005

2.630**

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

5.561

4.222**

TEACH

Designated Teaching Hospital

-2.674

-2.060*

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

-1.885

-2.727**

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirshman Index

0.802

1.192

Adjusted R Square

0.123

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.

There are no for-profit teaching hospitals. In addition, there is insufficient data
for inclusion of the Herfindahl-Hirshman index in the for-profit hospitals. Therefore,
these control variables are not included in the for-profit models.
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Table 36 provides the test of the fourth hypothesis by examining the incremental
relationship among CLINC and the NPR and other controlling variables in for-profit
hospitals. Significant relationships are found among the daily revenue per bed (NPR),
OSHPD case mix index (CMI), and log of the age of the hospitals (LNAGE). The
positive relationships indicate that a higher quality metric (CLINC) is associated with
higher daily revenue per bed, those hospitals that serve a variety of patients, and older
for-profit hospitals.

Table 36. Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics on Absolute
Value of Daily Revenue per Bed and Factors to Control for Risk 2009-2011 For-Profit
Hospitals
CLINCit = α0 + α1 NPRit + α2 SZEit + α3 CMIit + α4 LNAGEit + ɛit

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

-33.092

-3.457**

Constant

Intercept

NPR

Daily Revenue per Bed

3.151

2.795**

SZE

Number of Licensed Beds

0.007

0.841

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

7.766

3.091**

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

4.161

2.063*

Adjusted R Square

0.104

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.

Table 37 provides the test of the fifth hypothesis by examining the incremental
relationship among CLINC and the DOE and other controlling variables in for-profit
hospitals. Significant relationships are found among the daily operating expenses per bed
(DOE), OSHPD case mix index (CMI), and log of the age of the hospitals (LNAGE). The
positive relationships indicate that a higher quality metric (CLINC) is associated with
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higher daily revenue per bed, those hospitals that serve a variety of patients, and older
for-profit hospitals.

Table 37. Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics on Absolute
Value of Daily Operating Expenses per Bed and Factors to Control for Risk 2009-2011
For-profit Hospitals
CLINCit = α0 + α1 DOEit + α2 SZEit + α3 CMIit + α4 LNAGEit + ɛit

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

-33.092

-3.457**

Constant

Intercept

DOE

Daily Operating Expenses per Bed

8.812

4.210**

SZE

Number of Licensed Beds

0.006

0.445

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

7.436

3.066**

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

5.253

2.658**

Adjusted R Square

0.165

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.

Table 38 provides the test of the third hypothesis by examining the incremental
relationship among CLINC and the NPI and other controlling variables in for-profit
hospitals. Significant relationships are found among the net operating income per bed
(NPI) and the OSHPD case mix index (CMI). The positive relationships indicate that a
higher quality metric (CLINC) is associated with higher daily revenue per bed and those
for-profit hospitals that serve a variety of patients.
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Table 38. Mean Coefficient Estimates for Regressions of Quality Metrics on Absolute
Value of Daily Net Operating Income per Bed and Factors to Control for Risk 2009-2011
For-profit Hospitals
CLINCit = α0 + α1 NPIit + α2 SZEit + α3 CMIit + α4 LNAGEit + ɛit

Variable

Definition

Coefficients

t-statistics

-29.623

-3.108**

Constant

Intercept

NPI

Net Operating Income per Bed

1.499

2.260*

SZE

Number of Licensed Beds

0.006

0.799

CMI

OSHPD Case Mix Index

7.864

3.098**

LNAGE

Log of the Age of Hospital

3.641

1.796

Adjusted R Square

0.085

2

R

*, ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a single-tailed test.

Additional Sensitivity Analysis
Variables used in the models are defined the same by both California and
Washington hospital databases. As a result, it is unlikely, though possible, that there may
exist systemic differences between hospitals within the two states. To investigate the
possibility of such a difference, the tests were performed separately on Washington and
California nonprofit hospitals. The results were consistent with the previous tests in
which the two state hospitals were combined. Due to the small number of for-profit
Washington hospitals, the additional tests were performed on the California for-profit
hospitals alone and then combined with the Washington for-profit hospitals. Again, there
was no difference in the direction of the relationship or level of significance for any of
the variables.
In another sensitivity test, both the nonprofit and for-profit data were combined in
a larger sample and the tests were performed again with a dichotomous variable added to
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differentiate between nonprofit and for-profit. Once again, there was no difference in the
direction of the relationship or level of significance for any of the variables.
IV.

Conclusion
This paper examines for-profit and nonprofit hospital quality of care as it relates

to hospital efficiency. The contribution of this study is to provide qualified support of the
relationship between hospital quality of care in for-profit hospitals and hospital
performance. With the possible reduction of a large percentage of hospitals’ Medicare
payment, many hospitals could jeopardize their continued financial security.
This study contributes to prior literature in several ways. First, this study expands
the empirical setting by examining nonprofit and for-profit hospitals utilizing the CMS
scoring methods that took effect in October 2012. Second, this study is the first to proxy
the actual quality metrics CMS will use to pay hospitals. These metrics have not
previously been employed in research on quality of health care and costs. Third, the
results offer evidence of whether the quality standard of performance in hospital care is
related to cost efficiency and profitability.
The study finds that a relationship does exist between the quality of healthcare
and both cost efficiency and profitability. The results also show that this relationship
holds for both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. These findings are particularly timely
due to the eminent implementation of the new payment method to hospitals and the
hospital managers’ uncertainty regarding the new quality measures and their financial
considerations. The implications also are implicitly meaningful to other stakeholders
including the communities that the hospitals serve. With so many unknowns facing
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hospital administrators today, this research is designed to assist hospitals as they make
decisions about improving their quality of care.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was signed into law in
March 2010. This three-part dissertation strives to contribute to existing literature by
considering influences and benefits associated with the passage of the PPACA. The need
to improve the quality of accounting due to the change in Medicare fees in nonprofit
hospitals is examined. The market reaction to the passage of the law and the effect of the
new payment method as it relates to quality of healthcare for nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals are also investigated.
The first study examines both the usefulness of quality accounting in a nonprofit
hospital setting and the effect of the information reported on donations. The results of the
study show that accrual estimates in nonprofit hospitals’ third-party reserve accounts and
accompanying changes in investments are related to the quality of earnings, as evidenced
by the quality metric being indicative of future earnings. Furthermore there is evidence
of a relationship between donations and the quality of earnings. The results provide
qualified support that earnings quality in nonprofit hospitals needs to be improved.
Furthermore, this study presents a compelling argument to improve reliability and
relevance by setting accounting standards in the nonprofit hospital segment and providing
an improved method for estimating the third-party reserve accounts.
The second study examines whether the market is able to differentiate among
firms within a particular sector and even among individual sub-sectors that differ in their
exposure to government programs. The use of market adjusted returns does not show
evidence of abnormal returns around the event windows. However, when controls are
included in the analysis using a two-stage estimation method, positive and significant
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abnormal returns can be detected in healthcare firms. Taken together, these results
indicate that there were market reactions in healthcare firms related to Harry Reid’s letter
and the healthcare bill being passed in the House of Representatives, with the strongest
reaction occurring at the earlier event date.
The third paper examines for-profit and nonprofit hospital quality of care as it
relates to hospital efficiency. The study finds that a relationship does exist between the
quality of healthcare and both cost efficiency and profitability. The results also show that
this relationship holds for both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. These findings are
particularly timely due to the eminent implementation of the new payment method to
hospitals and the hospital managers’ uncertainty regarding the new quality measures and
their financial considerations.
This dissertation adds to the existing body of literature by adapting a financial
tool for use in the nonprofit hospital setting. It also contributes to the literature by linking
the PPACA and stock market returns as well as providing qualified support of the
relationship between hospital quality of care in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals and
hospital performance. With the possible reduction of a large percentage of hospitals’
Medicare payment, many hospitals could jeopardize their continued financial security.
With so many unknowns facing hospital administrators today, this research is designed to
assist hospitals as they make decisions about their financial future.
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APPENDIX
QUALITY MEASURES
HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM:
FISCAL YEAR 2013
Clinical Process of Care Measures
Measure ID
AMI-7a
AMI-8a
HF-1
PN-3b
PN-6
SCIP-Inf-1
SCIP-Inf-2
SCIP-Inf-3
SCIP-Inf-4
SCIP-Card-2
SCIP-VTE-1
SCIP-VTE-2

Measure Description
Acute Myocardial Infarction
Fibrinolytic Therapy Received Within 30 Minutes of Hospital Arrival
Primary PCI Received Within 90 Minutes of Hospital Arrival
Heart Failure
Discharge Instructions
Pneumonia
Blood Cultures Performed in the ED Prior to Initial Antibiotic Received in Hospital
Initial Antibiotic Selection for CAP in Immunocompetent Patient
Healthcare-associated Infections
Prophylactic Antibiotic Received Within One Hour Prior to Surgical Incision
Prophylactic Antibiotic Selection for Surgical Patients
Prophylactic Antibiotics Discontinued Within 24 Hours After Surgery End Time
Cardiac Surgery Patients with Controlled 6AM Postoperative Serum Glucose
Surgical Care Improvement
Surgery Patients on a Beta Blocker Prior to Arrival That Received a Beta Blocker During
the Perioperative Period
Surgery Patients with Recommended Venous Thromboembolism Prophylaxis Ordered
Surgery Patients Who Received Appropriate Venous Thromboembolism Prophylaxis
Within 24 Hours Prior to Surgery to 24 Hours After Surgery
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